# Round Report vs. Chattahoochee DM

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#### Security driven economic engagement with Latin America authorizes international violence while criminalizing dissent – the 1AC exhibits a discourse of security that provides the rationale for global domination.

Figueredo 7 [Darío Salinas, Professor in the Graduate Program in Social Sciences at the Universidad Iberoamericana, Mexico City, specialist in Latin American Studies at the CONACYT National System of Researchers, Latin American Perspectives, Issue 152, Vol. 34 No. 1, January, “Hegemony in the Coordinates of U.S. Policy: Implications for Latin America,” Translated by Marlene Medrano, p. 95-98]

The mobilization of an external threat, real or fictitious, and the belief in its intrinsic superiority have historically been important aspects of the discourse of U.S. policy, from the notion of the “savage” Native Americans to the Monroe Doctrine and the postulates of Manifest Destiny to the Huntingtonian elaboration that, by stressing cultural differences, suggests the capacity to harbor in its historical mission the germ of a “superior culture.”¶ After 1989, U.S. hegemony, in its search for a redefinition of the enemy, found in terrorism the threat it required to further its policy. The construction of this threat has not been free of inaccuracies and exaggerations. The most blatant example is that of the “weapons of mass destruction” supposedly in the hands of the deposed Baghdad regime, which, according to Washington, represented a real threat to U.S. security but which turned out to exist only in the political laboratory of the presidential team.¶ The new geostrategic order is overwhelmingly unilateral from the point of view of the political-military, financial, and technological power of the United States. The emergent polarities are fragmented and barely sketch a relative economic and commercial hierarchy, especially with regard to China, Japan, and Germany. At the same time, various indicators suggest a decline in the U.S. economy. The dynamic of these changes has important consequences for the conceptualization of the security issue.¶ During the cold war, “security” meant the traditional “state security.” It consisted of the perception of threats superimposed on the identification of internal conflicts that were treated as “subversive threats” supported from outside. Schematically, this was the general logic of the hegemonic notion of security that involved the “containment of communism” as an ideology. A political framework referred to as “national security doctrine” served as a model for the conduct of the majority of Latin American governments. The hypothesis of “civil war,” which gave rise to the “fight against subversion,” justified the installation or survival of dictatorships.¶ Recently, others attempting to identify structural causes for the conflicts that threaten security have revised this conceptualization. The context for this redefinition is globalization and its implication of interdependence. It is in this context that we can situate terrorism as a “global threat” articulated as a component of a security policy.¶ Finally, the transition to democracy has not resulted in a substantial restructuring of the armed forces. Despite the beneficent dimensions of the political changes in terms of human rights and a democratic rearrangement of the civil-military relationship (Tulchin, 2002), there is no indication of a significant change in the doctrinal framework that guided the actions of the armed forces up to the 1980s. Although there is no homogeneity within military institutions, a conceptual and doctrinal framework is maintained as a general rule. This is an advantage for the new security strategy connected with the fight against terrorism, given that its conception continues to be part of its capacity to control the conduct of others—in other words, to orchestrate its hegemony.¶ FREE TRADE AND SECURITY¶ The post–cold-war period has been characterized by the indisputable dominance of financial capital in the development of the global economy. The free circulation of unrestricted capital constitutes the motor of the model. The globalization of markets involves privatization and deregulation of the international financial system on a primarily speculative basis. The movement of international capital has been freed from the variables of the economy whose operation remained largely beyond the control of the national authorities in charge of economic policy, variables that Treasury secretaries often refer to in terms of a “difficult environment.” The proposal to transform the Latin American region into a free-trade zone is a reflection of this climate that, since 1989 and especially since the Washington Consensus, has been deployed as the ideology of neoliberalism and then as a policy converted into action (Cademartori, 2004).¶ In fact, U.S. conceptions of security and economic-commercial policy constitute an integrated geostrategic whole; the expansion of global commerce is part of the security strategy of the United States (Salinas, 2002). The project is aimed at standardizing the development of the world in terms of criteria that favor the economic-political configuration of the principal world power (Chossudovsky, 2002). Proposals of integration are not related exclusively to commercial issues. The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which should not be considered abandoned, and other free-trade treaties should be considered geopolitical mechanisms for developing a large-scale project of domination. These mechanisms range from the strictly economic to those concerning labor legislation, state reform, laws concerning intellectual property, the environment, natural and energy resources, knowledge, and culture. The free-trade treaties signed so far, Chile’s among them, endorse the totalizing character intended by Washington and Wall Street (Weintraub and Prado, 2005).¶ It is exactly from this angle that the core of this geostrategic conception can be appraised. Its most acute expression was in the formulation of the concept of the “preventive war,” which in the case of Iraq was carried out at the margins of international legality, confirming the unilateralism that is fundamental to decision making in the new geostrategic order.¶ Antiterrorist policy operates as a coercive force that has an impact on regimes whose margins of self-determination are most precarious. The comprehensive treatment of these challenges is expressed in the context of the fragmentation of Latin American foreign policy in the face of the pragmatic U.S. prioritization of drug trafficking, terrorism, and migration.¶ Since 9/11 the United States has attempted to implement its national security policy without much concern for the establishment of agreements. This course of action was ratified both in the Conference on Hemispheric Security in 2003 and in the meeting of secretaries of defense in 2004. Lack of concordance in the treatment of an agenda shared with the United States necessarily turns into a sounding board for a social and political imbalance that disturbs more than the surface of diplomacy. This may be responsible for the strong social pressure to reconsider military spending in the countries of Latin America given their serious deficiencies with regard to social welfare, stability, and security. In the face of this deficit, the significance of military spending as a percentage of the global product since 2001 cannot be overlooked (IISS, 2004).¶ For Latin America, a security setting excluding the United States would be unthinkable. It is appropriate, then, to identify some complications associated with this problem.¶ 1. If the principle of dissuasion no longer seems useful in the struggle against terrorism, it is clear that, despite the prioritization of military force, a policy of alliance is required. In this sense, Latin America is an essential area for the United States because of the importance of its “great southern border.” The historical influence of the United States in the area, beyond its actual strategic supremacy and the agreements already subscribed to, is the best breeding ground for a campaign in favor of validation of the concept of security embodied in the policy of “preventive war.” The demand for collaboration stems from its imperative character, which does not admit different views because those who are not friends are enemies.¶ 2. Multilateralism has lost its force, and its political-diplomatic tools have been debilitated. Although there is no concerted regional capacity to avoid the imposition of unilateralism, countertrends and doubts are arising that release new forms of interaction and collaboration, primarily in the Andes and South America (Rojas, 2003).¶ 3. The sovereignty of the other loses its legitimacy if there is a presumption in the North that under its protection terrorism is being covered up or supported or if there is suspicion concerning the construction of weapons of mass destruction. From this perspective, one of the principal dangers for the security of Latin America stems not from foreign armies or from guerrillas but from criminal organizations. The danger of this perspective is the possibility of criminalizing the social struggle that has been unleashed in the region.¶ 4. The limits of the policy have opened a space for the absolutization of “hard power”—in other words, military force—in the new model and the antiterrorist struggle. From a Latin American viewpoint, security requires a multidimensional reading that transcends the view entailed by that struggle.¶ The significance for U.S. policy assumed by the struggle against terrorism as a “war of global reach” or a “global enterprise of uncertain duration” is inseparable from the previous points (NSC, 2002). These statements are translated into the identification of threats or zones of threat in Latin America as follows:¶ 1. The “triple border” of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, which has long been a path for unregulated trade on a grand scale—in other words, for contraband of all types. Similar cases include the Tabatinga-Leticia corridor on the Brazilian border with Colombia, the Lake Agrio zone between Ecuador and Colombia, and the Darien Jungle.¶ 2. The current government of Venezuela, because of its alleged support of the Colombian guerrillas and for setting a bad political example for the region as a whole. Its economic and political initiatives potentially constitute expressions of a counter-balance to hegemonic politics, which may explain the intrusive and destabilizing harassment to which it is subject.¶ 3. The Cuban government, for its alleged support of international terrorism and the meaning of its politics.¶ 4. “Latin American terrorist organizations,” among them the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army in addition to drug traffickers and paramilitaries. This point implicates Colombia and its neighboring countries, along with the Caribbean basin, as an extraordinarily significant area for U.S. security policy. The U.S. resources destined for Plan Colombia and the Andean Regional Initiative and a sordid struggle for the drug market, added to the climate of war and violence, reflect a situation with the capacity to produce dynamics that unbalance the strategic perspective of regional stability.

#### Security politics authorizes limitless global destruction.

Der Derian 98 (James, Professor of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts, On Security, Ed. Lipschutz, p. 24-25)

No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of "security." In its name, peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign states, all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature--as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. In its name, weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in international relations, in its name billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent muted. We have inherited an ontotheology of security, that is, an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified." Continues... [7](http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0=www.ciaonet.org:80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note7) In this case, Walt cites IR scholar Robert Keohane on the hazards of "reflectivism," to warn off anyone who by inclination or error might wander into the foreign camp: "As Robert Keohane has noted, until these writers `have delineated . . . a research program and shown . . . that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field.' " [8](http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0=www.ciaonet.org:80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note8) By the end of the essay, one is left with the suspicion that the rapid changes in world politics have triggered a "security crisis" in security studies that requires extensive theoretical damage control. What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is, other than us ? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret--and possibly construct through the reinterpretation--a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities. The steps I take here in this direction are tentative and preliminary. I first undertake a brief history of the concept itself. Second, I present the "originary" form of security that has so dominated our conception of international relations, the Hobbesian episteme of realism. Third, I consider the impact of two major challenges to the Hobbesian episteme, that of Marx and Nietzsche. And finally, I suggest that Baudrillard provides the best, if most nullifying, analysis of security in late modernity. In short, I retell the story of realism as an historic encounter of fear and danger with power and order that produced four realist forms of security: epistemic, social, interpretive, and hyperreal. To preempt a predictable criticism, I wish to make it clear that I am not in search of an "alternative security." An easy defense is to invoke Heidegger, who declared that "questioning is the piety of thought." Foucault, however, gives the more powerful reason for a genealogy of security: I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the word alternative. My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. The hope is that in the interpretation of the most pressing dangers of late modernity we might be able to construct a form of security based on the appreciation and articulation rather than the normalization or extirpation of difference. Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness.

#### Reject the Aff’s security discourse – abandoning the attempt to eradicate insecurity is a prerequisite to meaningful political engagement.

Neocleous 8 [Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University, Critique of Security, p. 185-186]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether – to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ‘this is an insecure world’ and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security.¶ This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end – as the political end – constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible – that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve ‘security’, despite the fact that we are never quite told – never could be told – what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,141 dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more ‘sectors’ to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives.¶ Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole.142 The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up re-affirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths.¶ For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding ‘more security’ (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that ‘security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that ‘securitizing’ an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.143

### CP

#### CP Text: The United States federal government should phase out a substantial portion of its economic restrictions toward the Republic of Cuba except on oil sanctions.

### 1nc

#### Russia’s economy growing – key indicators prove

**Kelly, 8/19 –** (Lidia Kelly, Associated Press Staff Writer for Reuters. August 19, 2013. “Russia's economy shows signs of improving in July,” http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/08/19/uk-russia-economy-idUKBRE97I0HP20130819)//SDL

(Reuters) - Russia's economy showed small signs of improvement in July, data indicated on Monday, with business investment returning to growth and retail sales suggesting greater consumer confidence.¶ The data may somewhat ease worries that Russia is at risk of sliding into recession after economic growth in the second quarter slowed to 1.2 percent, in real terms from a year earlier, far below potential.¶ Capital investment, which accounts for about a fifth of gross domestic product and includes money put in tangible goods such as land, machinery or buildings, rose by 2.5 percent in July, the Federal Statistics Service said.¶ This follows a 3.7 percent decline in June.¶ Retail sales, a barometer of consumer demand, grew by 4.5 percent last month, while analysts had expected a rise of 3.6 percent.¶ Declining inflation, which fell to an annual 6.5 percent in July from 6.9 percent in the previous month, buoyed consumer spending.¶ "The data is encouraging, almost all indicators were much stronger than we expected," said Liza Ermolenko at Capital Economics in London.¶ "Over the coming months things are probably going to get better, and the second half of the year would be better than the first half."

#### Link – Plan reduces oil prices

#### Oil prices key to Russia’s economy – over half of government revenue

**Schuman, 12 –** (Michael Schuman, Associated Press Staff Writer for Times. July 5, 2012. “Why Vladimir Putin Needs Higher Oil Prices,” http://business.time.com/2012/07/05/why-vladimir-putin-needs-higher-oil-prices/)//SDL

But Vladimir Putin is not one of them. The economy that the Russian President has built not only runs on oil, but runs on oil priced extremely high. Falling oil prices means rising problems for Russia – both for the strength of its economic performance, and possibly, the strength of Putin himself.¶ Despite the fact that Russia has been labeled one of the world’s most promising emerging markets, often mentioned in the same breath as China and India, the Russian economy is actually quite different from the others. While India gains growth benefits from an expanding population, Russia, like much of Europe, is aging; while economists fret over China’s excessive dependence on investment, Russia badly needs more of it. Most of all, Russia is little more than an oil state in disguise. The country is the largest producer of oil in the world (yes, bigger even than Saudi Arabia), and Russia’s dependence on crude has been increasing. About a decade ago, oil and gas accounted for less than half of Russia’s exports; in recent years, that share has risen to two-thirds. Most of all, oil provides more than half of the federal government’s revenues.¶ What’s more, the economic model Putin has designed in Russia relies heavily not just on oil, but high oil prices. Oil lubricates the Russian economy by making possible the increases in government largesse that have fueled Russian consumption. Budget spending reached 23.6% of GDP in the first quarter of 2012, up from 15.2% four years earlier. What that means is Putin requires a higher oil price to meet his spending requirements today than he did just a few years ago.¶ Research firm Capital Economics figures that the government budget balanced at an oil price of $55 a barrel in 2008, but that now it balances at close to $120. Oil prices today have fallen far below that, with Brent near $100 and U.S. crude less than $90. The farther oil prices fall, the more pressure is placed on Putin’s budget, and the harder it is for him to keep spreading oil wealth to the greater population through the government. With a large swath of the populace angered by his re-election to the nation’s presidency in March, and protests erupting on the streets of Moscow, Putin can ill-afford a significant blow to the economy, or his ability to use government resources to firm up his popularity.

**Russian economic decline causes nuclear war**

**Filger 9** (Sheldon, Author – Huffington Post, “Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction”, <http://www.globaleconomiccrisis.com/blog/archives/356>)

**In Russia**, historically, **economic** health **and** political **stability are intertwined** to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation's history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia's economic crisis will endanger the nation's political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama's national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation's nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that **desperate personnel would** illicitly **sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations**. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

## Ethanol

#### Can’t re-build sugar sector – unworkable land and long-time frame.

Soligo ’10 – et al; Ronald Soligo is a professor emeritus of economics at Rice University and a Rice scholar at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy. The author writes a chapter within the book “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation,” a Brookings Publication, edited by Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska –obtained as an ebook through MSU Electronic Resources – page 102

Three and a half billion gallons seems unrealistic for the foreseeable future. There is some question as to whether Cuba could ever again attain the 1.5 million hectares of sugarcane harvested in 1970, let alone 2 million. According to Brian Pollitt, the 1970 harvest was achieved only by cutting cane that would normally be left to mature for another season in order to produce a higher sugar yield in the following year. 48 Obviously this is not a sustainable practice if optimal yields are to be achieved. Two billion gallons can be produced with a harvested area of 1.33 million hectares and a yield of seventy-five tons per hectare. That area of cultivation is not too far from the average harvest of 1.28 million hectares that Cuba was able to maintain during the 1970s and 1980s. Yet reaching 1.33 million hectares will require time and substantial investment in farm machinery and restoration of the land, which has been neglected and compacted by the use of heavy Soviet-built harvesting machinery. The land will also have to be tilled and newly planted with sugarcane. Achieving higher sugarcane yields will also require time and investments to acquire or develop higher-yielding sugarcane varieties. Cuban yields averaged only fifty-eight tons per hectare during the 1970s and 1980s, substantially below the seventy-five tons per hectare needed to produce 2 billion gallons of ethanol. Yet other countries, as noted, have achieved or exceeded that yield, and some private Cuban farmers are reported to have achieved even higher yields of 100 tons per acre. 49 Yields, of course, are a function of other factors besides cane variety. The condition of the land, access to water and fertilizer, and other inputs would all need to be considered.

#### **Non-unique --- Brazil is investing in Cuban sugar ethanol in the status quo and will only increase.**

Israel 12 – (Esteban, Reuters Correspondent to Brazil, “Brazil to breathe life into faded Cuban sugar sector,” Reuters, 1-30-12, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/30/brazil-cuba-sugar-idAFL2E8CUA7620120130)

SAO PAULO, Jan 30 (Reuters) - Brazilian builder Odebrecht plans to produce sugar in Cuba, the company said on Monday, as looser restrictions on foreign investment in the communist island raise hopes of a recovery in the once-booming sector after decades of decline. News of the project came on the day Brazil's President Dilma Rousseff begins a mostly ceremonial official visit to the country, which has been under communist rule since the Fidel Castro-led revolution and an ensuing U.S. trade embargo. Odebrecht will sign a "contract of productive administration" with Cuba's state sugar company Grupo de Administracion Empresarial del Azucar to operate the 5 de Septiembre mill in Cienfuegos province on the south coast. "The agreement for a period of 10 years aims for an incremental increase in the production of sugar and crushing capacity and help with an overhaul" of the sector, Odebrecht said in an email to Reuters through its press office. The project will finally open the capital-starved Cuban sugar industry to foreign inflows after years of failed attempts by overseas investors to gain a foothold in the sector nationalized several years after the 1959 revolution. Cuba's sugar production has fallen from a peak of 8 million tonnes in 1970 to just 1.2 million tonnes in the last harvest. The country was once the world's top sugar supplier. Odebrecht gave no further details but a Brazilian sugar sector executive told Reuters the contract could be signed this week during Rousseff's two-day visit, deepening Brazil's role in modernizing the island's dilapidated infrastructure. Brazil is not only the world's top sugar producer but a pioneer in cane-derived ethanol, with flex-fuel technology fitted to almost all new cars sold in the country enabling them to run on ethanol or gasoline or any mix of both. Odebrecht is also carrying out work estimated at $800 million to modernize the container port at Mariel, west of Havana. The project, largely financed by Brazil's development bank BNDES, is seen as vital for commerce should the United States lift its trade embargo with the island. Cuba has allowed foreign investment for more than a decade to develop other strategic industries including tourism and more recently, oil, with a consortium led by Spain's Repsol to explore Cuban waters in the Gulf of Mexico. ETHANOL ON AGENDA Cuba, where sugar once accounted for 90 percent of export earnings compared with under 5 percent last year, has drawn up plans to reorganize the industry and allow foreign investment for the first time since mills were nationalized. Its once-powerful Sugar Ministry was abolished last year, leaving it up to a new state-owned company to revamp the rusting industry, with many mills pre-dating the revolution and some built with capital provided by the Soviet Union. Odebrecht would also produce ethanol from sugarcane as well as electricity from the biomass that is left over when the cane is crushed, according to the Brazilian sugar industry executive who is familiar with the details of the project. "Cuba is opening up the possibility of producing ethanol through energy generation and Odebrecht will build a distillery there," the executive said, adding the project is similar to one Odebrecht is developing in Angola. That is a $258 million undertaking in partnership with Angola's Sonagol oil company to produce 260,000 tonnes of sugar, 30 million liters of ethanol and 45 megawatts of electricity. Large-scale ethanol production in Cuba has come up against opposition from former president Castro, a fierce critic of the use of edible crops as fuel. Some experts believe that with sufficient investment, Cuba has the potential to become the world's No. 3 biofuel producer after the United States and Brazil. Ron Soligo, economist at Rice University in Houston, Texas, and an expert on the Cuban sugar industry, calculates that the island could achieve ethanol output of 7.5 billion liters per year. Brazil, by comparison, produces roughly 20 billion liters. "But developing the ethanol sector in Cuba will take time, since most of the (cane-growing) land was abandoned for years," he said. Brazil, the world's No. 2 ethanol producer, has offered technical assistance to Cuba to produce the biofuel from cane. "The subject is on the table. There are investments planned in sugar and there exists a possibility that at some time this will be taken on board by the ethanol industry," a source at Brazil's foreign ministry told Reuters.

#### Soy makes destruction inevitable

Newell ’11 – Philip Newell is internally citing the WWF Report– Soya and the Cerrado: Brazil’s forgotten jewel. He is a research intern with the Nourishing the Planet project. August 2nd – http://blogs.worldwatch.org/nourishingtheplanet/wwf-report-soya-and-the-cerrado-brazil%E2%80%99s-forgotten-jewel/

According to a recent report released by WWF UK, the increased use of soy beans has had painful consequences for the Cerrado region of Brazil. The Cerrado is the unique savannah south of the Amazon Rainforest. This landscape, once covering a quarter of Brazil, holds an amazing 5 percent of all life on Earth. Since the prehistoric days when there was only one continent, this grassy expanse has harbored not only 11,000 flowering plants (nearly half are found only in the Cerrado) but also countless animal species, including the giant anteater and maned wolf. This rich history also imbues the land with cultural significance, as it has played a key role for over 10,000 years in the culture and religion of a variety of indigenous Brazilian societies. Currently, however, the Cerrado is being converted into farmland for the express purpose of growing soybeans (soya). In only 15 years, production of soy has doubled, now covering an area almost the size of Egypt worldwide. In Brazil, there are 24.1 million hectares planted with soy, equivalent to the size of the United Kingdom. Such a prolific conversion has devastated the natural biodiversity of the region. A recent survey suggests that by 2008, almost half of the original vegetation cover had been lost, disappearing at a rate significantly greater than the Amazon rainforest. This also has significant consequences for climate change. According to WWF, in the six year period between 2002 and 2008, land-use change in the Cerrado released 275 million tons of CO2 per year-more than half the total emissions for the United Kingdom. A whopping 80 percent of the soy grown worldwide is used for feeding cows, pigs, chickens and other livestock, according to the report. Current trends suggest that developing countries will continue to increase their meat consumption, until they match levels of developed countries. If soy remains one of the main components of livestock feed, then soy production will increase. Since most land planted with soy has already achieved maximum production levels (only the Indian region has room for improving yields), demand for land for soy planting will grow.

#### No impact to BioD

Easterbrook 3(Gregg, senior fellow at the New Republic, visiting fellow of the Brookings Institute, “We're All Gonna Die!”, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=1&topic=&topic\_set=)

If we're talking about doomsday - the end of human civilization - many scenarios simply don't measure up. A single nuclear bomb ignited by terrorists, for example, would be awful beyond words, but life would go on. People and machines might converge in ways that you and I would find ghastly, but from the standpoint of the future, they would probably represent an adaptation. Environmental collapse might make parts of the globe unpleasant, but considering that the biosphere has survived ice ages, it wouldn't be the final curtain. Depression, which has become 10 times more prevalent in Western nations in the postwar era, might grow so widespread that vast numbers of people would refuse to get out of bed, a possibility that Petranek suggested in a doomsday talk at the Technology Entertainment Design conference in 2002. But Marcel Proust, as miserable as he was, wrote *Remembrance of Things Past* while lying in bed.

#### **Aff doesn’t solve – only increases US corn output – can’t solve globally**

#### **No scarcity and no impact**

Jalsevac 4(Paul, Life site news a division of Interim Publishing, “The Inherent Racism of Population Control”, <http://www.lifesite.net/waronfamily/Population_Control/Inherentracism.pdf>)

The pattern continues today. Economist Dennis Avery explained in 1995 that, food production was more than keeping pace with population growth since the world had, “more than doubled world food output in the past 30 years. We have raised food supplies per person by 25 percent in the populous Third World.”4 The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (UNFAO) also dispelled fears of shortages in the food supply when, in preparation for the World Food Summit in Rome in November of 1995 it reported that, “Globally food supplies have more than doubled in the last 40 years…at a global level, there is probably no obstacle to food production rising to meet demand.”5 The UNFAO also later estimated that, simply with the present available technologies fully employed, the world could feed 30 to 35 billion people, i.e. roughly six times the present world population.6 It also reported that the number of people considered malnourished has declined from 36 percent in 1961-1970 to 20 percent in 1988-90 and later proclaimed that “earlier fears of chronic food shortages over much of the world proved unfounded.”7 The World Bank joined in to predict in 1993 that the improvement in the world food supply would continue, while pointing out that in developing countries grain production has grown at a faster rate than population since 1985. Grain production has slowed in the United States, but that is because stocks have grown so large that additional production could not be stored.8 A further wealth of evidence is available to remove any concerns about resource shortage in the modern world.

**Ending the embargo kills Cuba’s unique worm industry**

**Ewing, 08 –** (Ed Ewing, reporter for The Guardian. April 3, 2008. “Cuba's organic revolution,” http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2008/apr/04/organics.food)//SDL

But when the USSR collapsed in 1990/91, Cuba's ability to feed itself collapsed with it. "Within a year the country had lost 80% of its trade," explains the Cuba Organic Support Group (COSG). Over 1.3m tonnes of chemical fertilisers a year were lost. Fuel for transporting produce from the fields to the towns dried up. People started to go hungry. The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (UNFAO) estimated that calorie intake plunged from 2,600 a head in the late 1980s to between 1,000 and 1,500 by 1993. Radical action was needed, and quickly. "Cuba had to produce twice as much food, with less than half the chemical inputs," according to the COSG. Land was switched from export crops to food production, and tractors were switched for oxen. People were encouraged to move from the city to the land and organic farming methods were introduced. "Integrated pest management, crop rotation, composting and soil conservation were implemented," says the COSG. The country had to become expert in techniques like worm composting and biopesticides. "Worms and worm farm technology is now a **Cuban export**," says Dr Stephen Wilkinson, assistant director of the International Institute for the Study of Cuba. Thus, the unique system of organoponicos, or urban organic farming, was started. "Organoponicos are really gardens," explains Wilkinson, "they use organic methods and meet local needs." "Almost overnight," says the COSG, the ministry of agriculture established an urban gardening culture. By 1995 Havana had 25,000 huertos – allotments, farmed by families or small groups – and dozens of larger-scale organoponicos, or market gardens. The immediate crisis of hunger was over. Now, gardens for food take up 3.4% of urban land countrywide, and 8% of land in Havana. Cuba produced 3.2m tonnes of organic food in urban farms in 2002 and, UNFAO says, food intake is back at 2,600 calories a day. Organoponico plaza A visit to Havana's largest organoponico, the three-hectare Organoponico Plaza, which lies a stone's throw from the city's Plaza de la Revolución and the desk of Raul Castro, confirms that the scheme is doing well. Rows of strikingly neat irrigated raised beds are home to seasonal crops of lettuces, spring onions, chives, garlic and parsley. Guava and noni fruit trees provide shade around the perimeter, while on the far side compost piles sit next to plastic tunnels used to raise seedlings. Outside in the shop, signs extol the virtues of eating your greens. The shop is open only on Mondays. Produce is sold by the people who work the garden (they keep 50% of sales, so are motivated to produce a lot) to the people who live nearby. In this case, the organoponico serves an estate that wouldn't look out of place in Tower Hamlets or Easterhouse. Yet inside, butterflies flit and the head gardener, Toni, turns sod like he is digging at Prince Charles's Highgrove estate. A success then? "In terms of improving the diet of the population it has had a beneficial effect," says Wilkinson. "And it has been a success in terms of meeting some of the food security needs," he says, "but it has not resolved the problem since the island still imports a great deal of food." And change is on the horizon, which might be good for living standards, but not be so good for Cuba's commitment to pesticide-free food. The US **trade embargo** is losing its "symbolic meaning", says Julie M Bunck, assistant professor of political science at the University of Louisville and author of Fidel Castro and the Quest for a Revolutionary Culture in Cuba, and as that happens, "Cuba will evolve, embrace the market in some way, begin to produce and buy and sell normally." General farming will "most likely" move away from organic methods says Wilkinson. Farming on a large scale after all, he says, has seen a reduction in pesticide and fertiliser use mainly due to "**financial constraints, not choice**".

**Worms are key to planetary survival. No, seriously.**

**Blakemore 10** – (Dr. Rob Blakemore, student of ‘VermEcology’ for 30 years and holds qualifications in ecology, computing and permaculture. July 2, 2010. “Wonder Worm to the rescue,” http://ourworld.unu.edu/en/wonder-worm-to-the-rescue/)//SDL

Can worms help **save the planet**? I think so and, before arguing my case, please let me state my position from the start: I am an ecologist. Not just the type of trendy person who faithfully recycles — although I am fashionably green and a semi-vegetarian who tries to recycle as many beer bottles as possible. No, I am also the other, scientific kind. The science of ecology is generally defined as a study of organisms and their environment, i.e., everything! However, I would be somewhat more categorical and say that it is “The study of organisms, their products whether alive or dead, and their environment” — i.e., even more of everything, including fossil fuels and human endeavour! An ecologist then, is someone who considers holistic workings of a natural ecosystem in all its complexity and diversity throughout its time-cycle while breaking it down into its component parts and honing in on its few key, controlling entities. Simultaneously practicing as a generalist and as a multi-faceted specialist. Deeds of the dirt The experience of growing up in rural England alongside my grandfather, the village farrier who was also a bee keeper and gardener, as well as my weekend work with farmers and gamekeepers, immersed me in general natural history. This education was formalized by academic degrees in terrestrial and aquatic biology and, for me the key to life, soil ecology. The main movers and shakers in the soil are the living organisms, paramount amongst which is the humble, hidden earthworm. Here I must air my strong objections to marine biologists such as Sylvia Earle who pointed out after winning the TED 2009 Prize that the oceans make up 70% of the surface of the Earth and the rest is just “dirt”. Approximately 99.4% of our food and fibre is produced on land and only 0.6% comes from oceans and other aquatic ecosystems combined, [according to FAO](http://www.fao.org/ag/AGL/agll/soilbiod/consetxt.stm" \t "_blank). The calorific value obtained from ocean catches, freshwater fishing and aquaculture adds up to just about 10-16% of the current human total. (These figures are slightly skewed for maritime countries like Japan and Iceland but still, more than 80% of our nutrition is terrestrial in origin). Furthermore, I am sure Dr. Earle accepts that the oceanic ecosystem is wholly dependent upon dissolved nutrients washed down or blown from the soil and is similarly affected by pollution mainly from activity on the land. Her survival depends as much as anyone’s on the “just dirt” part. Thus it is abysmal that scientific knowledge of the oceans is infinitely deeper than for terrestrial ecosystems. Moreover, Leonardo da Vinci’s observed 500 years ago that “We know more about the movement of celestial bodies than about the soil underfoot” and this still rings true today. The journal Science, realizing that our knowledge is so scant, produced a special 2004 issue entitled [Soils — The Final Frontier](http://www.sciencemag.org/content/vol304/issue5677/" \l "special-issue" \t "_blank). Why waste precious funds and brain resources on the vain discovery of useless planets overhead or new deep-sea species that will still be there tomorrow, while vital unrecognized organisms literally beneath our feet disappear at an increasingly alarming rate and to our peril? Why are we not concentrating our efforts and valuable resources on protecting and preserving the tangible deeds of our earthly home patch for current and future generations of Earthlings? Where on earth is our Soil Ecology Institute? Global worming We talk of greenhouse gasses and global warming yet it is the [lithosphere](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lithosphere" \t "_blank" \o "The rigid outermost shell of a rocky planet. It comprises the crust and the portion of the upper mantle that behaves elastically on time scales of thousands of years or greater.), not the oceans nor trees, that acts as the major **global carbon sink**. This is especially so following the discovery just over a decade ago of [glomalin](http://www.ars.usda.gov/is/ar/archive/sep02/soil0902.htm" \t "_blank), a tightly bound organic molecule accounting for an extra 30% of stored soil carbon. (The energy crisis too can be cured by simply tapping freely into subterranean geothermal energy, as recounted in an Our World 2.0 article on this ‘ [red hot power](http://ourworld.unu.edu/en/geothermal-energy/" \t "_self)’.) Proper management of our arable, pastoral and forest soils is the most practically feasible mechanism to sequester atmospheric carbon without any adverse effects. Atmospheric carbon is entirely recycled via the soil from plants in around 12-20 years — all of this being processed **through the intestines of worms**. **Vermicomposting** of organics and encouraging soil biodiversity by rebuilding humus provides a natural closed-system remedy with neither waste nor loss of productivity. Down-to-Earth soil species All manner of dirt and disease always ends up in the sod and consequentially its ecology is naturally robust. Yet, the soil suffers the most profound and significant effects from over-exploitation and faces the greatest threat from erosion, destruction and pollution with artificial chemicals and/or transgenes. Despite its importance, soil biodiversity is so poorly known that even obvious organisms like the relatively large worms are mostly unclassified. On each field trip I find new species and, of the 10,000 that have been given scientific names thus far (perhaps less than a third of the total), we know something of the ecology about a dozen species. But what we do know doesn’t look good. Unprecedented loss of species abundance and diversity combined with high extinction rates are bringing Earth into new and uncharted territory. We urgently need triage. Laboratories crammed with scores of ecologists could study just worms for their whole careers and still we would only progress slightly from our current poor state of knowledge, but our gain would be justifiable and have tangible effects on resolving pressing environmental issues. But this is not the current situation. Fundamentally we can justify study of soil ecology because it affects all our lives and is a **crucially important** issue for **immediate survival of humans and all other terrestrial organisms**. Whereas earthworm specialists are an endangered and rapidly declining breed, some scientists attempt to defend their studies that look at a single crop or pest. In contrast, I would argue that without earthworms there would be no healthy soil in which any healthy crop could develop in the first place. If we ask “Which group of organisms would cause the most **disruption to life support systems** on the Earth if lost?” My answer would be that — rather than fish, birds and bees, or humans — it is the earthworms. They are **key links** in food chains (not just for fish and fowl), they act as hosts and vectors for diverse symbionts and parasites, and they are the major detritus feeders responsible for soil mineralization and recycling of organic matter. Can other scientists, outside of medicine, claim such importance for their study subject? Looking forward to the past One of the main predictions, highly optimistic, in the revolutionary move into our post-industrial era (see [Alvin Toffler’s The Third Wave](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Third_Wave_%28book%29" \t "_blank) for details) was that genetic engineering would provide new production methods and have profound effects on future development. In many ways this has been borne out in medical use and microbial ‘manufacture’ with genetically modified organisms (GMOs) that provide some potential benefit and serve some purpose, albeit at huge cost. But there are equally large risks. Rather obviously, the main characteristic of life is to reproduce and disperse. The architects of the modified corn, cotton, soy, wheat, rice and spuds are often of exactly the same companies (or at least profit-driven mind-sets) that produced the toxic chemicals that they are now telling us their new GMO technology will replace — just as chemical engineers promised solutions to all our problems previously. In 1962 Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring first alerted us to risks of agricultural chemical pollution, exacerbated by bioaccumulation in body tissue (especially of invertebrates such as earthworms) and bioconcentration further up the food-chain. But whatever the problem, these chemicals will eventually disperse and decline once production halts. With biology the reverse is true. Design a plant to be herbicide or insect resistant and it will increase and spread by its own means, by cross-pollination or genetic drift. Case in point is the [illegitimate escape in Japan](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16827549" \t "_blank) of feral oilseed rape ( Brassica napus) genetically modified to resist herbicide that, as with any similar calamity, will continue in an uncontrollable fashion. Rather than addressing immediate environmental issues per se, much of scientific resources are diverted into molecular studies, mostly for industrial agricultural production, that are inordinately expensive, or into agronomic trials of effective toxic biocide applications. Mostly this is not requested by informed consumers nor by farmers who must rely on the advice of often industry-funded ‘experts’ and extension officers (hopefully not advertisers). Surprisingly and shamefully, almost **zero funding is available for** research on organic production ‘alternatives’ that are dismissed as impractical fads. Yet it is their implementation, since the start of the agricultural revolution 10,000 years ago, that has brought us this far. Let’s not let topsoil slip through our fingers Topsoil is the most valuable resource upon which civilizations depend. Its rapid loss combined with soil fertility and soil health decline are of greatest immediate concern. How important is loss of topsoil? Basically **without fertile topsoil there is no plant growth and no life on land**. How big an issue is loss of topsoil? The 1991 UN funded [Global Survey of Human-Induced Soil Degradation Report](http://www.isric.org/UK/About+ISRIC/Projects/Track+Record/GLASOD.htm" \t "_blank) showed significant problems in virtually all parts of the world. Just 11% of the Earth’s terrestrial surface is cultivated and of the total available, approximately 40% of agricultural land is seriously degraded, according to the UN’S 2005 [Millennium Ecosystem Assessment](http://www.millenniumassessment.org/documents/document.300.aspx.pdf" \t "_blank) (MEA). Loss of topsoil has been due to the combined effects of desertification, salinization, erosion, pollution and urban/road or other development activities. In the United States alone it is estimated to cost about $125 billion per year. The MEA, which despite its scope did not consider ‘Soil Systems’ separately, nevertheless ranked land degradation among the world’s greatest environmental challenges, claiming it risked **destabilizing societies**, **endangering food security** and increasing **poverty**. Among the worst affected regions are Central America, where 75% of land is infertile, Africa, where a fifth of soil is degraded, and Asia, where 11% is now unsuitable for farming. In addition to those pollutants commonly recognized as originating from biocides and fertilizers, there are many other sources — such as antibiotics associated with intensive animal production, plus a ‘cocktail’ of human-processed pollutants like drugs, solvents and synthetic hormones from birth control pills — that all make their way into the environment in an infinite variety of unforeseeable combinations. Suggested remediation to soil decline and agricultural production are to use GMO crops and other high-tech applications, because there is an assumption that topsoil formation is a centuries-old process that is essentially non-renewable and thus is gone forever. This view is false and there are several examples of methods that can be applied to restore fertile topsoils to farms, and in a time frame as short as a matter of a few years. Feed the worm “When the question is asked, ‘Can I build top-soil?’ the answer is ‘Yes’, and when the first question is followed by a second question, ‘How?’ the answer is ‘Feed earthworms’,” so wrote Eve Balfour in the introduction to Thomas J. Barrett’s book, Harnessing the Earthworm. Indeed there are many instances of organic farms around the world preserving or restoring healthy soils. Organic farming has many approaches, with Rudolph Steiner’s biodynamics being one manifestation. All these solutions comfortably find a home under the wide umbrella of permaculture, as defined by Bill Mollison. This philosophy and approach to designing our natural environment for efficient and effective production and for comfortable living under prevailing conditions is well known and widely adopted by national and local communities and individuals worldwide. William Blake urged us “[t]o see a world in a grain of sand and a heaven in a wildflower”. Soil survey of the abundance and diversity of earthworms in a soil will provide a good measure of natural fertility, as these are the monitors and mediators of soil health. That some of our honourable predecessors appreciated the worm’s role is manifest by one translation of the Chinese characters for ‘earthworms’ being ‘angels of the earth’. Seeing a worm turned up by the plough and eaten by a bird started Prince Siddhartha (Gautama Buddah) on his contemplative path to understanding the Cycle-of-Life. In the Classical world, the ‘father of biology’, Aristotle, called earthworms the “soil’s entrails” and it is reported that Cleopatra decreed them sacred. Charles ***Darwin***, British naturalist and father of evolution, also had an interest in earthworms. In 1881, the year before he died, his 40 year study culminated in publication The Formation of Vegetable Mould through the Action of Worms. As a founder of soil ecology, he was one of the first scientists to give credence to conventional wisdom from earlier civilizations about the beneficial effects of earthworms on soils and plant growth, and thus on **human survival**. Believing his worm work one of his most crucial contributions, Darwin stated: “It may be doubted whether there are many other animals which have played so important a part in the history of the world, as have these lowly organized creatures… “The vegetable mould [humus] which covers, as with a mantle, the surface of the land, has all passed many times through their bodies.” Hopefully it will continue thus. In 1981, as a centennial tribute to Darwin’s seminal work, I completed a survey on Lady Eve Balfour’s [Haughley experimental farm](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haughley_Experiment" \t "_blank) that showed organic methods encourage healthy soil and an earthworm abundance. Significantly higher maintenance of temperature, moisture and organic matter in the soil equated with double the carbon content. In this way we could readily fix runaway CO2 in the atmosphere. Moreover, crop production was equable between organic and non-organic management regimes, even without factoring in the cost savings in chemicals and environmental degradation. (Details are [presented here](http://bio-eco.eis.ynu.ac.jp/eng/database/earthworm/Haughley%5CHaughley.pdf" \t "_blank).) Look up to the worm My thesis is that each of the three major interlinked influences on our world – mass extinction of species due mainly to human activity, global warming from excessive anthropogenic generated carbon, and risk of social and political dysfunction from impending resource and food shortages caused by population pressure — can all be redressed by educating people (and politicians!) about restoring soil health and fertility. One way to start is to re-process organic ‘wastes’ via worms, for a natural compost fertilizer.

**Cuba and Canada are economic ties now- plan destroys them**

**Ritter 10** (Archibald Ritter, Department of Economics and School of International Affairs University of Carleton. Spring 2010. "CANADA'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA, 1990 TO 2010 AND BEYOND,” <http://thecubaneconomy.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/CFP.pdf)//SDL>Canada and Cuba have further developed a mutually advantageous economic relationship¶ during the 1990s and 2000s.Trade, tourism, foreign investment, development assistance, and¶ migration all have expanded significantly from1994 to 2010, albeit with ups and downs. The¶ Canadian economic connection has been especially valuable for Cuba, as it has been¶ responsible for a large proportion of Cuba’s foreign exchange earnings generated by tourism,¶ nickel exports, and foreign investment in mining, domestic oil and gas extraction, and¶ electricity generation.¶ Canada’s economic relations with Cuba are likely to change in a variety of ways in the next¶ 10 to 15 years. First, the United States and Cuba will undoubtedly normalize their relations.¶ When this happens, the economic and human interaction between those countries will¶ overwhelm the Canada-Cuba interaction. The geo-economic gravitational pull of the United¶ States will be strong. After United States-Cuba rapprochement, Canadian trade and¶ investment as a proportion of total trade and investment will likely diminish, although both¶ might increase in absolute terms. In sum, the displacement effect will be powerful. Will it¶ outweigh the expansionary effects on Canadian economic relations with Cuba that will result¶ from the economic recovery and that will be stimulated by United States-Cuba normalization?

**The plan kills the Canadian economy**

**JOC 96** (Journal of Commerce. February 19, 1996. "U.S. Embargo of Cuba Lines Pockets In Canada,”articles.sun-sentinel.com/1996-02-19/business/9602160148\_1\_cuba-ships-foreign-investors)//SDL"Your Sen. Helms, he's our hero," joked one stevedoring company official. And while the reference to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman was meant to be facetious, it points to an important shift in world trading patterns. As Cuba opens its doors to foreign investors - and the U.S. embargo keeps American companies on the sidelines - Canadian, European and Asian businesses are filling much of the gap.¶ Because Canada is geographically closer to Cuba than many of Havana's other trading partners, Canadian companies have benefited handsomely from Cuba's recent overtures to foreign traders and investors.¶ In the first six months of 1995, the two-way merchandise trade nearly doubled over the same period in 1994, going from $100 million to $185 million, according to Canadian government figures.¶ The full-year comparison of 1995 to 1994 is even more impressive, according to Alberto Rio, Cuba's trade attache in Montreal. The two-way trade in merchandise was worth $392 million in 1995, a 66 percent increase over the 1994 figure of $237 million, he said.¶ Much of that trade - more than half of it, according to Rio - originates in Cuba, which ships nickel, cobalt, sugar, seafood, rum and cigars to Canada. Canadian exports to Cuba run a wider gamut, including machinery, cars and car parts, electrical equipment, grains, lumber, pulp and paper and a variety of food and manufactured goods. Canadian investors, mainly in mining, tourism and manufacturing, also do a thriving business in Cuba.

**Canadian economic growth is key to avoiding war in the Arctic—avoids a power vacuum land grab.**

**Dobransky 12** (Steve Dobransky, Adjunct Professor at Lakeland College, Ph.D. candidate at Kent State University, M.A. from Ohio University and a B.A. from Cleveland State University. 2012. “Military Security, Energy Resources, and the Emergence of the Northwest Passage: Canada’s Arctic Dilemma,” <http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2012/0106/ca/dobransky_arctic.html>)//SDL

Canada’s apparent inability in winning over the international community on its Arctic argument has been a growing concern for a significant number of Canadians, especially some conservative politicians and nationalistic citizens and scholars. A good number of books and articles have been written on the Arctic. A large number have come in the last 15-20 years, corresponding to the recognition that the Arctic ice was going to start melting and, thereby, open up increased international activities in the region.15 Stephen Harper and his Conservative Party came into power in 2006 with Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic as a major political issue. After proclaiming its desire to increase Canada’s Arctic forces and ships, the Harper government ordered only 6-8 icebreakers, which later turned out to be the wrong type of ships and the orders have yet to be completed. Canada is carrying out better and stronger actions on its Arctic policy, but its economic and force limitations are being exposed and creating a difficult political dilemma for the future.16¶ If Canada is to achieve its territorial and diplomatic ambitions, then it likely requires a much greater civilian and military presence in the Arctic all year-round. Yet, there is no indication that Canadians are willing to sacrifice their current social system of extensive benefits for a much larger military budget and Arctic force. And, there is no evidence that Canadians want to pay much more in taxes or commit to a military draft. Canada has only around 70,000 active-duty military personnel, 30,000 reserve forces, and a $20 billion/year military budget. Its Arctic-ready forces and equipment are just a handful, a few thousand personnel at best who are truly specialists, mainly the Canadian Rangers. Moreover, there is no indication that Canada’s economy will greatly expand in the foreseeable future to produce the necessary surplus wealth to pay for a sizeable increase in an Arctic force. Canada’s economic growth has not been great over the last decade, let alone ever. Thus, Canada presents a very vocal case for the Arctic but has been unable to completely back up its claims with the necessary increases in personnel, materials, ships, and money, which is very telling for the future. If not by now, then when?17¶ If Canada is unwilling to shift or produce enough resources to create a sufficient Arctic force that is capable of fully securing the region over the three thousand miles of waterways, plus above and beneath the surface, then it opens up the possibility that other forces outside the region may move in and claim the trillions of dollars in natural resources. Russia is an obvious pursuer. The U.S. is another option. China, with its massively growing need for oil—especially when it runs out of much of its own domestic sources in approximately 10 years—will be looking everywhere for oil opportunities. Any country that can move oil rigs and mining companies into the Arctic area, operate them and maintain them, and have enough forces to possibly defend them will have trillions of reasons to act pro-actively. Hypothetical but quite possible. Can or will Canada defend this entire region on its own? Can or will Canadians risk an all-out war with Russia, China, or some other major power for control over all of the Arctic resources? Is Canada even capable of going into the ring against any of the major powers, especially if and when there is a great need and crisis in energy resources?18¶ Canada can make many public proclamations and scholarly materials on its claims to the Arctic, but its inability or unwillingness to move aggressively to secure the emerging Arctic region is a signal to all that this could become an open-season area in the near future. The Arctic is increasingly looking like the grounds for a potential rivalry similar to the Western World’s colonization, an Oklahoma land rush, a California gold rush, and of course an Alaskan and Klondike gold rush. Maybe all rolled up into one. There are so many valuable resources in this Arctic area that one can only imagine how aggressively countries will act in the coming years and decades as natural resources become increasingly scarce and they become increasingly desperate for more resources and revenues. The massive amount of resources in the Arctic are there for the taking unless Canada is willing to make significant sacrifices to secure the area. Much greater taxation, a major reduction in social welfare benefits, lower wages, longer work hours, much greater economic production, and a significantly larger military that may require a draft, are all one and together necessary options if Canada is to establish fully a sizeable force to secure the entire Arctic region on its side year-round. Canadians spent years debating whether or not to spend the money for 6-8 ships for the Arctic, which is miniscule but indicative of Canadian priorities and intentions. Much greater resources and sacrifices have to be made. Ironically, Canadians may have to give up being Canadian and become more like Americans in order to make and implement the necessary policy changes and play successfully the game of power politics. So far, most Canadians do not appear willing to give up most of what it is to be Canadian. But, will this change in the future?19¶ Canadians can hope that other countries do not eventually move into the Arctic region, but it appears increasingly obvious that Canadians are passing the torch and initiative to other countries to make the final decision. Canadians, of course, will reject this but the lack of major action and investment in the Arctic region over the past several decades suggest that Canada’s claims to the region rests more on political and legal talk than real power and action. There has been no indication for the last several years in which the Arctic is now being freely traversed year-round that Canadians have changed in any significant way. If Canadians have chosen to rest their claims on the hope that other countries in the future will sacrifice their wealth, power, and standard of living, let alone trillions of dollars in economic opportunities, just on their own goodwill or moral conscience, then it would be a truly dangerous gamble for Canadians. But, in the end, if Canadians are not willing to make the major sacrifices to protect the Arctic and all of its resources, then it is their free choice. Other countries will take note and act accordingly when the time is right and the imperative arises. Power usually trumps legal arguments and paper trails. The Arctic may be the quintessential example in the future.20

**Goes nuclear**

**Wallace, 10** (Professor Emeritus at the University of British Columbia, March, “Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons A Task Long Overdue”, http://www.arcticsecurity.org/docs/arctic-nuclear-report-web.pdf)

¶ The fact is, the Arctic is becoming a zone of increased military competition. Russian President Medvedev ¶ has announced the creation of a special military force to defend Arctic claims. Last year Russian General ¶ Vladimir Shamanov declared that Russian troops would step up training for Arctic combat, and that ¶ Russia’s submarine fleet would increase its “operational radius.”55 Recently, two Russian attack submarines ¶ were spotted off the U.S. east coast for the first time in 15 years.56¶ In January 2009, on the eve of Obama’s inauguration, President Bush issued a National Security Presidential ¶ Directive on Arctic Regional Policy. It affirmed as a priority the preservation of U.S. military vessel ¶ and aircraft mobility and transit throughout the Arctic, including the Northwest Passage, and foresaw ¶ greater capabilities to protect U.S. borders in the Arctic.57¶ The Bush administration’s disastrous eight years in office, particularly its decision to withdraw from the ¶ ABM treaty and deploy missile defence interceptors and a radar station in Eastern Europe, have greatly ¶ contributed to the instability we are seeing today, even though the Obama administration has scaled ¶ back the planned deployments. The Arctic has figured in this renewed interest in Cold War weapons ¶ systems, particularly the upgrading of the Thule Ballistic Missile Early Warning System radar in ¶ Northern Greenland for ballistic missile defence.¶ The Canadian government, as well, has put forward new military capabilities to protect Canadian ¶ sovereignty claims in the Arctic, including proposed ice-capable ships, a northern military training base ¶ and a deep-water port. Earlier this year Denmark released an all-party defence position paper that suggests the country should create a dedicated Arctic military contingent that draws on army, navy, and air force assets with ship-based helicopters able to drop troops anywhere. Danish fighter planes would be tasked to patrol Greenlandic airspace. Last year Norway chose to buy 48 Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jets, partly because of their suitability ¶ ¶ for Arctic patrols. In March, that country held a major Arctic military practice involving 7,000 soldiers ¶ ¶ from 13 countries in which a fictional country called Northland seized offshore oil rigs. The manoeuvres prompted a protest from Russia – which objected again in June after Sweden held its ¶ ¶ largest northern military exercise since the end of the Second World War. About 12,000 troops, 50 ¶ ¶ aircraft and several warships were involved. Jayantha Dhanapala, President of Pugwash and former UN under-secretary for disarmament affairs, ¶ ¶ summarized the situation bluntly: “From those in the international peace and security sector, deep ¶ ¶ concerns are being expressed over the fact that two nuclear weapon states – the United States and the ¶ ¶ Russian Federation, which together own 95 per cent of the nuclear weapons in the world – converge on ¶ ¶ the Arctic and have competing claims. These claims, together with those of other allied NATO countries ¶ ¶ – Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway – could, if unresolved, lead to conflict escalating into the ¶ ¶ threat or use of nuclear weapons.”61 Many will no doubt argue that this is excessively alarmist, but no ¶ ¶ circumstance in which nuclear powers find themselves in military confrontation can be taken lightly. The current geo-political threat level is nebulous and low – for now, according to Rob Huebert of the ¶ ¶ University of Calgary, “[the] issue is the uncertainty as Arctic states and non-Arctic states begin to ¶ ¶ recognize the geo-political/economic significance of the Arctic because of climate change.”

#### **High-tech ag cooperation high – program implemented**

ACN 6/8 ­– Cuban News Agency, (“China and Cuba to Advance Cooperation in Agriculture”, 6/8/13, <http://www.cubanews.ain.cu/2013/130608Advance%20Cooperation.htm>, AW)

The issue was addressed by Cuban Agriculture minister Gustavo Rodriguez during a meeting in Beijing with his Chinese counterpart Han Changfu, according to PL news agency. The Chinese government official recalled a recent visit to Cuba in which he met with the historic leaders of the Cuban Revolution and he stressed the importance of implementing a cooperation program signed by the two Agriculture ministries during the visit to China by President Raul Castro last year. The two parties agreed that although some actions have been taken on the basis of the accord, there is mutual interest in the advancement of that program. Minister Han Changfu also expressed his willingness to further increase scientific and technical exchange and innovation in the industrial and agriculture sectors. The two agriculture ministers exchanged views on the measures being implemented by the Cuban government in the sector. The Cuban official briefed his host about the transformations that are underway in the area as part of the update of the island’s economic sector.

#### Lifting restrictions won’t dramatically increase exports – US firms won’t issue open credit to Cuba.

Messina 03 – William, Coordinator of Economic Analysis, Department of Food and Resource Economics, Florida Cooperative Extension Service, 2003 U.S.-Cuban Agricultural Trade: Present Realities and Future Prospects1 <http://www.ilfb.org/media/253618/u_of_florida_testimony_on_cuba.pdf>

Cuba's trade flows were more or less in balance until the early 1960s when the economy suddenly had to adjust to the shock of losing its most important trade partner, the United States.4 The immediate impact was a rapid growth in Cuba's trade deficit. However, once the Cuban economy began to be supported and subsidized by the Soviet Union, these trade deficits were not particularly important. However, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent dissolution of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON),5 Cuba once again lost its most important trading partner and, in this case, its all-important source of economic support. At this point, the flaws in Cuba's economic system, which were responsible for generating its large trade deficits, began to manifest themselves. Foreign investment flows, net revenues from tourism, and even the aforementioned hard currency remittances from Cuban-Americans are not sufficient to offset trade deficits that increase each year and totaled nearly 3.3 billion pesos in 2002 (Anuario de Estadístico de Cuba, 2002).6 As a result, Cuba is considered an extremely high credit risk in global financial markets, with Euromoney Magazine ranking Cuba 181st out of 184 countries in their 2003 analysis of country credit risk (Euromoney Magazine, 2003). Only Somalia, Iraq, North Korea, and Afghanistan ranked lower. Under such circumstances, it is unlikely that many U.S. firms are going to issue open credit to Cuba, so allowing credit sales alone likely would not be sufficient to dramatically increase U.S. agricultural and food exports to Cuba. Following an opening of credit sales to Cuba, the next step might be for U.S. firms to seek access to U.S. government Export Credit Guarantee programs for agricultural and food sales to Cuba. However, that would be a very contentious issue and one that would generate a great deal of animated discussion and debate on Capitol Hill.

## National Security

#### No Latin American terrorism

Richard Weitz 11, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Political-Military Analysis, Hudson Institute. “Where are Latin America’s Terrorists?” 11-9-11http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/where-are-latin-america-s-terrorists-

The Colombian army’s killing of Alfonso Cano, head of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), will not eliminate that country’s largest guerrilla group anytime soon. But it does partly illustrate why international terrorism has not established a major presence in Latin America. Local security forces, bolstered by generous American assistance, have made the region a difficult place for foreign terrorists to set up operational cells – and other conditions also help to make Latin America less vulnerable. One reason why the FARC has survived repeated blows to its leadership is the support that it receives from various groups, perhaps including government officials, in neighboring Ecuador and Venezuela. Fortunately, this backing appears to have declined in the last year or so, following improvement in Colombia’s relations with these countries. Another factor contributing to the FARC’s survival has been its transformation over the years from a revolutionary organization into a narco-terrorist group that uses violence to support its criminal operations. Many former terrorist and insurgent groups in the region have undergone similar transformations over the last two decades. These groups, some with transnational reach, mostly engage in narcotics trafficking, arms smuggling, and kidnapping. At worst, they sometimes employ terrorist tactics (commonly defined as violence that deliberately targets civilians). In Colombia, the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN) finance their operations through drug trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion. These groups might kill civilians, but their main targets are the police and security personnel who threaten their activities. Latin America is distinctive in the recurring and broad overlap of mass movements professing revolutionary goals with transnational criminal operations. The Internet and modern social media are allowing these mass criminal movements to expand their activities beyond kidnapping, extortion, and trafficking in drugs, arms, and people, to include fraud, piracy, information theft, hacking, and sabotage. Violent mass movements remain in some Latin American countries, but, like the FARC, they are typically heavily engaged in organized crime. Drug cartels and gang warfare may ruin the lives of thousands of innocent people, but they should not be seen as equivalent to the ideological revolutionaries who used to wreak havoc in the region, or to contemporary mass terrorists. Extra-regional terrorist movements such as al-Qaeda have minimal presence in South America, with little independent operational activity and few ties to local violent movements. At most, the two types of groups might share operational insights and revenue from transnational criminal operations. Hezbollah has not conducted an attack in Latin America in almost two decades. Indigenous organized criminal movements are responsible for the most serious sources of local violence. Latin American countries generally are not a conducive environment for major terrorist groups. They lack large Muslim communities that could provide a bridgehead for Islamist extremist movements based in Africa and the Middle East. The demise of military dictatorships and the spread of democratic regimes throughout Latin America (except for Cuba) means that even severe economic, class, ethnic, and other tensions now more often manifest themselves politically, in struggles for votes and influence. No Latin American government appears to remain an active state sponsor of foreign terrorist movements. At worst, certain public officials may tolerate some foreign terrorists’ activities and neglect to act vigorously against them. More often, governments misapply anti-terrorist laws against their non-violent opponents. For example, despite significant improvement in its human-rights policies, the Chilean government has at times applied harsh anti-terrorism laws against indigenous Mapuche protesters. Indeed, Latin American terrorism is sometimes exaggerated, because governments have incentives to cite local terrorist threats to secure foreign support, such as US capacity-building funding. Just as during the Cold War, when Latin American leaders were lavished with aid for fighting communist subversion, governments seek to fight “terrorist” threats at America’s expense. Ironically, the strength of transnational criminal organizations in Latin America may act as a barrier to external terrorist groups. Extra-regional terrorists certainly have incentives to penetrate the region. Entering the US, a high-value target for some violent extremist groups, from Latin America is not difficult for skilled operatives. Extra-regional terrorist groups could also raise funds and collaborate operationally with local militants. But Latin America’s powerful transnational criminal movements, such as the gangs in Mexico that control much of the drug trafficking into the US, do not want to jeopardize their profits by associating themselves with al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Supporting terrorism would merely divert time and other resources from profit-making activities, while focusing unsought US and other international attention on their criminal operations.

## Engagement Adv.

**There is no uniqueness to this advantage—no evidence that multilat is declining now—here’s evidence that says the opposite**

**Walt 11** (Stephen, Professor of International Relations – Harvard University, “Does the U.S. still need to reassure its allies?” Foreign Policy, 12-5, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/05/us\_credibility\_is\_not\_our\_problem, GDI File)

A perennial preoccupation of U.S. diplomacy has been the perceived need to reassure allies of our reliability. Throughout the Cold War, U.S. leaders worried that any loss of credibility might cause dominoes to fall, lead key allies to "bandwagon" with the Soviet Union, or result in some form of "Finlandization." Such concerns justified fighting so-called "credibility wars" (including Vietnam), where the main concern was not the direct stakes of the contest but rather the need to retain a reputation for resolve and capability. Similar fears also led the United States to deploy thousands of nuclear weapons in Europe, as a supposed counter to Soviet missiles targeted against our NATO allies. The possibility that key allies would abandon us was almost always exaggerated, but U.S. leaders remain overly sensitive to the possibility. So Vice President Joe Biden has been out on the road this past week, telling various U.S. allies that "the United States isn't going anywhere." (He wasn't suggesting we're stuck in a rut, of course, but saying that the imminent withdrawal from Iraq doesn't mean a retreat to isolationism or anything like that.) There's nothing really wrong with offering up this sort of comforting rhetoric, but I've never really understood whyleaders were so worried about the credibility of our commitments to others. For starters, given our remarkably secure geopolitical position, whether U.S. pledges are credible is first and foremost a problem for those who are dependent on U.S. help. We should therefore take our allies' occasional hints about realignment or neutrality with some skepticism; they have every incentive to try to make us worry about it, but in most cases little incentive to **actually do it**.

Unilateralism is what sustains primacy – other states bandwagon with the US for fear of other rising powers. Moving towards multilateralism makes it unsustainable

Seldena, 13 – assistant professor of political science at the University of Florida (Zachary, “Balancing Against or Balancing With? The Spectrum of Alignment and the Endurance of American Hegemony” Security Studies Volume 22, Issue 2, 2013, Taylor and Francis)

¶ Understanding which of these choices—soft balancing against the hegemon or alignment with the hegemon—is more prevalent among second-tier states has significant ramifications for the endurance of American hegemony. The record of the 2001–2009 period indicates that a wide range of second-tier states not only aligned with the United States, they strengthened their security cooperation in a manner that extended the reach of the us military at a time when American foreign policy was widely seen as unilateral. 3 In addition, they did so by incurring certain costs that helped to spread the burden of maintaining the American hegemonic system. This pattern of alignment with the United States has implications for the endurance of American hegemony because states aligned with the United States may have more at stake in the maintenance of American hegemony than the United States itself. A smaller American naval presence in the Asia Pacific region, for example, may be seen as a relatively minor shift in the United States with some beneficial budgetary savings. In Vietnam, Australia, or the Philippines, however, such a shift could prompt a wholesale reevaluation of national defense policy and have costly implications. Therefore, second-tier states have an incentive to participate in activities that extend the endurance of American hegemony, even if they do not receive a formal security guarantee for their efforts.¶ This may have implications for American foreign policy. There are distinct policy recommendations flowing from the logic of those scholars and policy professionals who argue that a more proactive and unilateral foreign policy speeds the decline of American hegemony. The most important of these is that the United States should practice a policy of self-restraint that defers to international organizations, which would alleviate concerns about the current preponderance of the United States in the international system. 4 A policy of self-restraint would signal that the United States is not a threat to other major powers and preclude attempts at balancing. This policy would also help to set a norm for the behavior of future great powers and recognize the emerging reality of a multipolar world. 5 Another policy implication from this line of reasoning is that the United States should reduce its global military presence that both encourages balancing behavior by other states and speeds hegemonic decline by draining financial resources. 6¶ Yet, this policy of restraint may be precisely what would cause second-tier states to question the utility of their security relationship with the United States and move away from policies that help to maintain American hegemony. This could at least partially explain the trend of states moving to establish closer security relationships with the United States in the 2001–2009 period, when it was at its most proactive and least deferential to international organizations. States may logically conclude that a hegemon willing to project power regardless of international opinion will be likely to use its power in the defense of the hegemony that is in the interest of second-tier states. Second-tier states might be far less willing to contribute to the maintenance of American hegemony if the United States behaves in a manner that raises doubts as to the durability of its commitments or its willingness to use its power in the international arena. Thus, what would trigger a serious decline in the cooperation that helps to sustain American hegemony would be a self-imposed reduction in the ability of the United States to project power and an increased reluctance to use its power in support of its national interests.

#### US unilateral action is inevitable – ideology – committing to multilateralism in one instance doesn’t solve

**Bass 9** (James E Bass, Major, US Air Force, “Unilateral vs. Multilateral Engagement: A Scenario-Based Approach to Guiding America’s Future Foreign Policy,” Air Command and Staff College, Air University, p. 3-6, April 2009, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA539615)

According to Stewart Patrick of the Center on International Cooperation, **America’s preference for unilateral engagement is explained by three inherent characteristics.** **First, a sense of “exceptionalism” that evolved from America’s founding principles has had major influence on US policy goals and engagement.**5 As a champion for liberal principles the US is motivated to cooperate with others to promote universal prosperity and security. Nevertheless, **American exceptionalism also motivates the US to protect its values, and avoid any engagement that might infringe upon its sovereignty**.6 In fact, America’s preoccupation with safeguarding sovereignty yielded a predilection for unilateralism throughout the 1900’s.7 Not until it attained great power status, did the US consent to multilateralism. Specifically, after World War II, the US employed multilateralism to rebuild a favorable international framework that would counter the strategic threat posed by the Soviet Union. The Cold War dominated foreign policy until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. During the Cold War period foreign policy was dictated by the executive branch and focused primarily on the threat of nuclear war. The President committed to multilateral agreements where it served national security.8 **Second, the system of checks and balances built into the US Constitution produced a separation of powers that limits the government’s ability to endorse multilateral commitments**. Specifically, two-thirds of the Senate must support a treaty for ratification to occur. **This construct makes it possible for political minorities to hinder multilateral engagement.**9 For example, during World War I the Republican-controlled Senate rejected US membership in the League of Nations despite President Wilson’s support.10 **Third, America’s current hegemonic status provides incentive to act unilaterally because multilateral engagement is based on rules and norms rather than power.** As a consequence, the weaker power is strengthened from the benefits of multilateral cooperation, while the stronger power endures the costs of restraint.11 For example, a given UN convention limiting freedom of action with regard to national instruments of power could severely hamper achievement of US strategic objectives putting vital interests at risk. On the same note, such a convention could embolden a weaker adversary to hold US interests at risk without fear of retribution assuming that the US will limit its response within the restraints of the convention. Here **it is helpful to note specific instances in which the three inherent characteristics aforementioned have guided US action on foreign policy issues**. To begin with, **the US has used military force without United Nations (UN) approval**. While the US did attain UN approval for coalition intervention to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait, America’s frustrations with the impediments of multilateralism lead it to act without UN approval in the 1998 bombing of Iraq and the 1999 ousting of Serbian forces from Kosovo. **These interventions set a precedent for the future unilateral use of force**.12 Indeed, **the US demonstrated its most dramatic disregard for international institutions in March of 2003** when President Bush unilaterally issued Saddam Hussein an ultimatum despite a lack of UN support. While the US made an effort to gain UN authorization for the war in Iraq, there is little doubt that the administration had already determined its intended course of action prior to submitting the UN proposal for use of force in February of 2003. America’s praiseworthy efforts to gain UN support was a multilateral endeavor that initially suppressed anti-American sentiments.13 However, the “Bush Doctrine” and America’s failed efforts to restore stability in post-war Iraq proved US policy to be shortsighted resulting in international opposition to US policy and calling into question traditional east-west alliances.14 At the same time, the US has increasingly restricted support for UN peacekeeping operations since its failures in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.15 In addition to declining peacekeeping assistance, the US is also to blame, in part, for the shortcomings in UN effectiveness due to its neglectful financial provisions. In fact, the UN case is only one of several instances in which the US demonstrated a disregard for international institutions through its waning financial support during the 1990s.16 **The US has also shown disregard for multilateral cooperation on global security issues.** Regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats, the US Senate approved the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997 only after insisting on exemptions that diluted its impact, and in 1999 the Senate weakened nonproliferation efforts and snubbed allies when it rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.17 Also in 1999, the US upset international order by espousing support for a national missile defense (NMD) system that violated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Risking global strategic stability, in 2001 the Bush administration pushed Moscow for modification of the ABM Treaty, and subsequently withdrew unilaterally in 2002 after failing to secure Russia’s cooperation.18 Yet another example of US indifference to multilateral cooperation with regard to WMD threats involves the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Ineffective due to the absence of a compliance scheme, international efforts to implement verification procedures were rejected by the Bush administration in 2001on the grounds that they did not coincide with US national interests.19 **US lack of interest in multilateral cooperation on global security issues extends beyond WMD threats**. For example, in 1997 the Clinton administration refused to sign the Ottawa Convention banning antipersonnel land mines. Despite the fact that the convention has been signed by 156 countries, the US still declines accession arguing that land mines are a critical component of its Korea strategy.20 Also in 2001, a draft UN convention to limit small arms trafficking was singularly opposed by the Bush administration’s insistence on curtailment of the conventions terms. The US was uncompromising on limits to civilian small arms ownership and advocated several other changes that weakened the draft convention.21 The US has held many countries to high standards on international issues such as human rights, technology transfers, antiterrorism, and narcotics interdiction, imposing punishment on those that fail to meet US standards.22 Nevertheless, the US has frequently been wary of taking on international commitments. For example, the US has declined to ratify the International Criminal Court and the UN conventions on the Rights of the Child and Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. While the US was a major contributor to the growth of multilateral free trade initiatives in the 1990s, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the World Trade Organization, it engaged in unilateralism to gain market concessions.23 **The US has also been reluctant to embrace conventions that address world-wide issues such as global warming**, evidenced by the Bush administration’s refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol on climate change in 2001.

#### Multilat doesn’t solve anything – assumes every single one of their warrants – star this card

Held et al, 13 – Master of University College and Professor of Politics and International Relations, at the University of Durham, and Director of Polity Press and General Editor of Global Policy (David, “Gridlock: the growing breakdown of global cooperation,” ProQuest, 5/24/2013, http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/1355105016) // MS

Economic and political shifts in large part attributable to the successes of the post-war multilateral order are now amongst the factors grinding that system into gridlock. The Doha round of trade negotiations is deadlocked, despite eight successful multilateral trade rounds before it. Climate negotiators have met for two decades without finding a way to stem global emissions. The UN is paralyzed in the face of growing insecurities across the world, the latest dramatic example being Syria. Each of these phenomena could be treated as if it was independent, and an explanation sought for the peculiarities of its causes. Yet, such a perspective would fail to show what they, along with numerous other instances of breakdown in international negotiations, have in common. Global cooperation is gridlocked across a range of issue areas. The reasons for this are not the result of any single underlying causal structure, but rather of several underlying dynamics that work together. Global cooperation today is failing not simply because it is very difficult to solve many global problems - indeed it is - but because previous phases of global cooperation have been incredibly successful, producing unintended consequences that have overwhelmed the problem-solving capacities of the very institutions that created them. It is hard to see how this situation can be unravelled, given failures of contemporary global leadership, the weaknesses of NGOs in converting popular campaigns into institutional change and reform, and the domestic political landscapes of the most powerful countries. A golden era of governed globalization In order to understand why gridlock has come about it is important to understand how it was that the post-Second World War era facilitated, in many respects, a successful form of 'governed globalization' that contributed to relative peace and prosperity across the world over several decades. This period was marked by peace between the great powers, although there were many proxy wars fought out in the global South. This relative stability created the conditions for what now can be regarded as an unprecedented period of prosperity that characterized the 1950s onward. Although it is by no means the sole cause, the UN is central to this story, helping to create conditions under which decolonization and successive waves of democratization could take root, profoundly altering world politics. While the economic record of the postwar years varies by country, many experienced significant economic growth and living standards rose rapidly across significant parts of the world. By the late 1980s a variety of East Asian countries were beginning to grow at an unprecedented speed, and by the late 1990s countries such as China, India and Brazil had gained significant economic momentum, a process that continues to this day. Meanwhile, the institutionalization of international cooperation proceeded at an equally impressive pace. In 1909, 37 intergovernmental organizations existed; in 2011, the number of institutions and their various off-shoots had grown to 7608 (Union of International Associations 2011). There was substantial growth in the number of international treaties in force, as well as the number of international regimes, formal and informal. At the same time, new kinds of. Postwar institutions created the conditions under which a multitude of actors could benefit from forming multinational companies, investing abroad, developing global production chains, and engaging with a plethora of other social and economic processes associated with globalization. These conditions, combined with the expansionary logic of capitalism and basic technological innovation, changed the nature of the world economy, radically increasing dependence on people and countries from every corner of the world. This interdependence, in turn, created demand for further institutionalization, which states seeking the benefits of cooperation provided, beginning the cycle anew. This is not to say that international institutions were the only cause of the dynamic form of globalization experienced over the last few decades. Changes in the nature of global capitalism, including breakthroughs in transportation and information technology, are obviously critical drivers of interdependence. However, all of these changes were allowed to thrive and develop because they took place in a relatively open, peaceful, liberal, institutionalized world order. By preventing World War Three and another Great Depression, the multilateral order arguably did just as much for interdependence as microprocessors or email (see Mueller 1990; O'Neal and Russett 1997). Beyond the special privileges of the great powers Self-reinforcing interdependence has now progressed to the point where it has altered our ability to engage in further global cooperation. That is, economic and political shifts in large part attributable to the successes of the post-war multilateral order are now amongst the factors grinding that system into gridlock. Because of the remarkable success of global cooperation in the postwar order, human interconnectedness weighs much more heavily on politics than it did in 1945. The need for international cooperation has never been higher. Yet the "supply" side of the equation, institutionalized multilateral cooperation, has stalled. In areas such as nuclear proliferation, the explosion of small arms sales, terrorism, failed states, global economic imbalances, financial market instability, global poverty and inequality, biodiversity losses, water deficits and climate change, multilateral and transnational cooperation is now increasingly ineffective or threadbare. Gridlock is not unique to one issue domain, but appears to be becoming a general feature of global governance: cooperation seems to be increasingly difficult and deficient at precisely the time when it is needed most. It is possible to identify four reasons for this blockage, four pathways to gridlock: rising multipolarity, institutional inertia, harder problems, and institutional fragmentation.

# Block

### 2NC – Overview

#### Accidental US/Russian nuclear war.

Stephen J. Cimbala, May 2007. Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University. “Russia's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: Realistic or Uncertain?” Comparative Strategy 26.3, Ebsco.

War between Russia and America is unlikely, but misunderstanding and misperception with respect to their military ends and means are not. U.S. nuclear modernization plans impact on Russian perceptions of their great-power status and vice versa. The U.S. has a shared interest with Russia in the avoidance of inadvertent nuclear war or escalation. This is **especially the case given Russia’s proclivities for nervous behavior during crises and its threat perceptions still blinkered by Cold War defeat and NATO expansion**. Reassurance is an important component of both American and Russian conventional and nuclear deterrence. Russia must be reassured that NATO is not expanding for the purpose of shrinking Russia to pre-Petrine dimensions. As well, the U.S. has a security interest in maintaining a stable east and central Eurasia. That means, among other things, a viable Russian state not torn apart by regional or internal wars.

#### Magnitude - It’s the only existential risk

Nick Bostrum, Professor of Philosophy, Yale University, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards,” 2002, www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html.

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

### Perception Thumper

#### Plan triggers the link immediately **Brannon**3/29/**2012 (**Director of Economic Policy as well as the Director of Congressional Relations for the American Action Forum <http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/294768/domestic-oil-policies-do-impact-oil-prices-ike-brannon>)

Oil speculation is essentially the process of betting on future prices. People who anticipate needing a good deal of oil in the future and want to guard against the uncertainty of higher prices can enter into a contract that — for a fee — allows them to lock in a price today. While some people use futures contracts to hedge against future prices, others actively offer to take the risk, and those people we call speculators. If a speculator expects prices to rise in the future, he will make large investments in oil today that he may then sell at the later, higher price. For those with the means, there is much money to be made in this way, and the actions of speculators can and do influence the world price of oil. The expectation of higher prices leads to greater consumption which, like any increase in demand, leads to higher prices, creating a self-fulfilling prophesy. It works the opposite way as well: If speculators began to anticipate prices falling in the future, they would want to sell their shares sooner rather than later, since delaying will force them to accept lower prices. This would result in an immediate increase in supply, which would in turn bring down prices today.

#### High alert guarantees accidents – kills all life and happens 30 minutes

Helen **Caldicott**, founder of Physicians for Social Responsibility and former Nobel Peace Prize nominee, 200**2**, “The New Nuclear Danger: George W. Bush’s Military-Industrial Complex”, New Press: New York, p. 7-12

If launched from Russia, nuclear weapons would explode over American cities thirty minutes after takeoff. (China's twenty missiles are liquidfueled, not solid-fueled. They take many hours to fuel and could not be used in a surprise attack, but they would produce similar damage if launched. Other nuclear-armed nations, such as India and Pakistan, do not have the missile technology to attack the U.S.) It is assumed that most cities with a population over 100,000 people are targeted by Russia. During these thirty minutes, the U.S. early-warning infrared satellite detectors signal the attack to the strategic air command in Colorado. They in turn notify the president, who has approximately three minutes to decide whether or not to launch a counterattack. In the counterforce scenario the US. government currently embraces, he does launch, the missiles pass mid-space, and the whole operation is over within one hour. Landing at 20 times the speed of sound, nuclear weapons explode over cities, with heat equal to that inside the center of the sun. There is practically no warning, except the emergency broadcast system on radio or TV, which gives the public only minutes to reach the nearest fallout shelter, assuming there is one. There is no time to collect children or immediate family members. The bomb, or bombs-because most major cities will be hit with more than one explosion-will gouge out craters 200 feet deep and 1000 feet in diameter if they explode at ground level. Most, however, are programmed to produce an air burst, which increases the diameter of destruction, but creates a shallower crater. Half a mile from the epicenter all buildings will be destroyed, and at 1.7 miles only reinforced concrete buildings will remain. At 2.7 miles bare skeletons of buildings still stand, single-family residences have disappeared, 50 percent are dead and 40 percent severely injured.' Bricks and mortar are converted to missiles traveling at hundreds of miles an hour. Bodies have been sucked out of buildings and converted to missiles themselves, flying through the air at l00 miles per hour. Severe overpressures (pressure many times greater than normal atmospheric have popcorned windows, producing millions of shards of flying glass, causing decapitations and shocking lacerations. Overpressures have also entered the nose, mouth, and ears, inducing rupture of lungs and rupture of the tympanic membranes or eardrums. Most people will suffer severe burns. In Hiroshima, which was devastated by a very small bomb-13 kilotons compared to the current 1000 kilotons-a child actually disappeared, vaporized, leaving his shadow on the concrete pavement behind him. A mother was running, holding her baby, and both she and the baby were converted to a charcoal statue. The heat will be so intense that dry objects-furniture, clothes, and dry wood-will spontaneously ignite. Humans will become walking, flaming torches. Forty or fifty miles from the explosion people will instantly be blinded from retinal burns if they glance at the flash. Huge firestorms will engulf thousands of square miles, fanned by winds from the explosion that transiently exceed 1000 miles per hour. People in fallout shelters will be asphyxiated as fire sucks oxygen from the shelters. (This happened in Hamburg after the Allied bombing in WWII when temperatures within the shelters, caused by conventional bombs, reached 1472 degrees Fahrenheit.)" Most of the city and its people will be converted to radioactive dust shot up in the mushroom cloud. The area of lethal fallout from this cloud will depend upon the prevailing wind and weather conditions; it could cover thousands of square miles. Doses of 5000 rads (a rad is a measure of radiation dose) or more experienced by people close to the explosion-if they are still aliv-will produce acute encephalopathic syndrome. The cells of the brain will become so damaged that they would swell. Because the brain is enclosed in a fixed bony space, there is no room for swelling, so the pressure inside the skull rises, inducing symptoms of excitability, acute nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, severe headache, and seizures, followed by coma and death within twenty-four hours. A lower dose of 1000 rads causes death from gastrointestinal symptoms. The lining cells of the gut die, as do the cells in the bone marrow that fight infection and that cause blood clotting. Mouth ulcers, loss of appetite, severe colicky abdominal pain, nausea, vomiting, and bloody diarrhea occur within seven to fourteen days. Death follows severe fluid loss, infection, hemorrhage, and starvation. At 450 rads, 50 percent of the population dies. Hair drops out, vomiting and bloody diarrhea occurs, accompanied by bleeding under the skin and from the gums. Death occurs from internal hemorrhage, generalized septicemia, and infection. Severe trauma and injuries exacerbate the fallout symptoms, so patients die more readily from lower doses of radiation. Infants, children, and old people are more sensitive to radiation than healthy adults. Within bombed areas, fatalities will occur from a combination of trauma, burns, radiation sickness, and starvation. There will be virtually no medical care, even for the relief of pain, because most physicians work within The United States owns 103 nuclear power plants, plus many other dangerous radioactive facilities related to past activities of the cold war. A 1000- kiloton bomb (1 megaton) landing on a standard iooo megawatt reactor and its cooling pools, which contain intensely radioactive spent nuclear fuel, would permanently contaminate an .' area the size of western Germany3 The International Atomic Energy Agency now considers these facilities to be attractive terrorist targets, ' post-September 11,2001. Millions of decaying bodies-human and animal alike-will rot, infected with viruses and bacteria that will mutate in the radioactive-environment to become more lethal. Trillions of insects, naturally ' resistant to radiation-flies, fleas, cockroaches, and lice--will transmit disease from the dead to the living, to people whose immune mechanisms have been severely compromised by the high levels of background radiation. Rodents will multiply by the millions among the corpses and shattered sewerage systems. Epidemics of diseases now controlled by immunization and good hygiene will reappear: such as measles, polio, typhoid, cholera, whooping cough, diphtheria, smallpox, plague, tuberculosis, meningitis, malaria, and hepatitis. Anyone who makes it to a fallout shelter and is not asphyxiated in it, will need to stay there for at least six months until the radiation decays sufficiently so outside survival is possible. It has been postulated that perhaps older people should be sent outside to scavenge for food because they will not live long enough to develop malignancies from the fallout (cancer and leukemia have long incubation periods ranging from five to sixty But any food that manages to grow will be toxic because plants concentrate radioactive elements.\*/ Finally, we must examine the systemic global effects of a nuclear . , war. Firestorms will consume oil wells, chemical facilities, cities, and forests, covering the earth with a blanket of thick, black, radioactive , I I ' smoke, reducing sunlight to 17 percent of normal. One year or more ' ) , will be required for light and temperature to return to normalper- "r haps supranormal values, as sunlight would return to more than its , , usual intensity, enhanced in the ultraviolet spectrum by depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer. Subfreezing temperatures could destroy the biological support system for civilization, resulting in massive starvation, thirst, and hypothermia.5 To quote a 1985 SCOPE document published by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, "the total loss of human agricultural and societal support systems would result in the loss of almost all humans on Earth, essentially equally among combatant and noncombatant countries alike . . . this vulnerability is an aspect not currently a part of the understanding of nuclear war; not only are the major combatant countries in danger, but virtually the entire human population is being held hostage to the large-scale use of nuclear weapons. . . .",! i The proposed START I11 treaty between Russia and America, even if it were implemented, would still allow 3000 to 5000 hydrogen bombs to be maintained on alert."the threshold for nuclear winter? One thousand loo-kiloton bombs blowing up loo cities7-a I c distinct possibility given current capabilities and targeting plans. On January 25,1995, military technicians at radar stations in northern Russia detected signals from an American missile that had just been launched off the coast of Norway carrying a US. scientific probe. Although the Russians had been previously notified of this launch, the alert had been forgotten or ignored. Aware that US. submarines could launch a missile containing eight deadly hydrogen bombs fifteen minutes from Moscow, Russian officials assumed that America had initiated a nuclear war. For the first time in history, the Russian computer containing nuclear launch codes was opened. President Boris Yeltsin, sitting at that computer being advised on how to launch a nuclear war by his military officers, had only a three minute interval to make a decision. At the last moment, the US. missile veered off course. He realized that Russia was not under attack.' If Russia had launched its missiles, the U.S. early-warning satellites would immediately have detected them, and radioed back to Cheyenne Mountain. This would have led to the notification of the president, who also would have had three minutes to make his launch decision, and America’s missiles would then have been fired from their silos. We were thus within minutes of global annihilation that day. Today, Russia’s early-warning and nuclear command systems are deteriorating. Russia’s early warning system fails to operate up to seven hours a day because only one-third of its radars are functional, and two of the nine global geographical areas are covered by its missile-warning satellites are not under surveillance for missile detection. To make matters worse, the equipment controlling nuclear weapons malfunctions frequently, and critical electronic devices and controllers sometimes switch to combat mode for no apparent reason. According to the CIA, seven times during the fall of 1996 operations at some Russian nuclear weapons facilities were severely disrupted when robbers tried to “mine” critical communications cables for their copper! This vulnerable Russian system could easily be stressed by an internal or international political crisis, when the danger of accidental or indeed intentional nuclear war would become very real. And the U.S. itself is not invulnerable to error. In August 1999, for example, when the National Imagery and Mapping Agency was installing a new computer to deal with the potential Y2K problems, this operation triggered a computer malfunction which rendered the agency “blind” for days; it took more than eight months for the defect to be fully repaired. As the New York Times reported, part of America’s nuclear early-warning system was rendered incompetent for almost a year. (At that time I was sitting at a meeting in the west wing of the White House discussing potentially dangerous Y2K nuclear weapons glitches. Several Pentagon officials blithely reassured me that everything would function normally during the roll-over. But in fact, their intelligence system had already been disabled.) Such a situation has the potential for catastrophe. If American cannot observe what the Russians are doing with their nuclear weapons—or vice versa—especially during a serious international crisis they are likely to err on the side of “caution,” which could mean that something as benign as the launch of a weather satellite could actually trigger annihilation of the planet. This situation became even more significant after the September 11 attack.

#### Deterrence checks conventional conflict escalation

C. Paul **Robinson**, President and Director, Sandia National Laboratories, 3/22/0**1**, “Pursuing a New Nuclear Weapons Policy for the 21st Century”, http://www.sandia.gov/media/whitepaper/2001-04-Robinson.htm, umn-rks

Let me then state my most important conclusion directly: I believe nuclear weapons must have an abiding place in the international scene for the foreseeable future. I believe that the world, in fact, would become more dangerous, not less dangerous, were U.S. nuclear weapons to be absent. The most important role for our nuclear weapons is to serve as a “sobering force,” one that can cap the level of destruction of military conflicts and thus force all sides to come to their senses. This is the enduring purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world. I regret that we have not yet captured such thinking in our public statements as to why the U.S. will retain nuclear deterrence as a cornerstone of our defense policy, and urge that we do so in the upcoming Nuclear Posture Review. Nuclear deterrence becomes in my view a “countervailing” force and, in fact, a potent antidote to military aggression on the part of nations. But to succeed in harnessing this power, effective nuclear weapons strategies and policies are necessary ingredients to help shape and maintain a stable and peaceful world.

### 2NC – Turns Heg

#### Turns Case: Russian collapse will shift the balance of power away from the US towards China—this terminally jacks hegemony.

Zeyno **Baran** et al, Summer **2007**. Senior Fellow and Director Center for Eurasian Studies, Hudson Institute. “U.S. – RUSSIAN RELATIONS : IS CONFLICT INEVITABLE?” Hudson Institute Symposium on US-Russian Relations, www.hudson.org/files/pdf\_upload/Russia-Web%20(2).pdf.

The West needs a stable Russia in order to maintain the global balance of power against China. In the event of Russia’s disintegration, her resources will go to China, not the West. The West cannot stop Russia’s slide into a systemic cri- sis, and can only help get out of it once it has begun. This is a challenge for the future. Currently, the West needs a “Cold War” only with Russia’s new masters, not with the Russian people. Russians are protesting against the politics of the Russian bureaucracy, and their protest should not be re-directed at the bureaucracy’s strategic partners in the West. If the West understands and accepts this, it needs to learn to acknowledge Russians’ rights to patriotism and to a normal level of freedom—not as a religious symbol, but as the only path to prosperity and justice. Russian “democrats” and “liberals” have forgotten these demands and rights, and therefore the terms “dem - o crat” and “liberal” are cursed in Russia. Official propa- ganda uses this to divert Russian citizens from asserting their interests and rights to fighting the West. The West needs to explain to Russia that these rights have been destroyed not by rivalry with the West, but solely by the avarice of the new Russian leaders. It is true that in the future, the issue of global competition will arise. Currently, however, there is only one key prob- lem—corruption (including, of course, corruption in the interests of the West) and a lack of bureaucratic integrity. After Russia experiences a systemic crisis the West must be able to say to Russians; “You see? We are for democracy, but not for “democrats,” for law, but not for lawyers, for prosperity, but not for prospering oligarchs.” All of these are things that the West could not say after the 1990s. Russia will be useful to the West if the West can side with Russia against China and global Islam in foreign policy and with the Russian people against the Russian bureaucracy in domestic policy. If the West attempts to transform Russia according to its own conceptualization of the correct societal order, or simply to seize Russian raw materials, intellect, and money, it will destroy Russia and pay dearly for the rela- tively small gain. As a consequenceof doing so, **the West will experience large-scale, global systemic problems**.

## 2NC – Uniqueness

#### **Oil prices high – speculation of Syria**

Reuters 9/6, Reuters Magazine, 9/6/13, (“Oil Prices Drift Higher; Jobs, Syria in Focus”, <http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2013/09/06/oil-prices-drift-higher-jobs-syria-in-focus/>, AW)

Global oil prices edged firmer above $115 a barrel on Friday, with investors looking to expected U.S. jobs data that could move the Federal Reserve closer to unwinding a massive stimulus programme that has boosted commodities.¶ Concern that a potential U.S. strike on Syria would spread unrest and further disrupt Middle East supplies had boosted oil prices in recent weeks and benchmark Brent crude oil is heading for a fourth straight weekly rise.¶ Gains have been limited, however, as U.S. President Barack Obama comes under growing pressure from other leaders not to order a military strike on Syria due to fears that it would hurt the global economy and push up oil prices.

#### **Oil is at $114 – this is a factual claim**

The Nation 9/28 – The Nation Magazine, (“Petroleum products prices may rise by up to Rs4 a liter from Oct. 01”, <http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/business/23-Sep-2013/petroleum-products-prices-may-rise-by-up-to-rs4-a-liter-from-oct-01>, AW)

Prices of various petroleum products are likely to increase by up to Rs4 per liter from October 01. According to OGRA sources, the rise is expected because of rising oil prices in the international markets wherein crude oil prices have risen to $114 per barrel from $111 per barrel. In the local market, petrol prices are likely to increase by Rs4 per liter, kerosene oil by Rs2.50 per liter, diesel by Rs2 a liter and light diesel oil by Rs2.15 a liter. Sources said Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority will send the final summary on September 29 to the ministry of petroleum for approval in this regard.

## 2NC – Link

### 2NC ­– Saudi Flood

#### **Plan causes a Saudi flood – massively increases output – the brink is now**

Rahemtulla 7/30 – Karim, Chief Investment Director of Oil and Energy Daily, BA in Economics and MA in Finance, (“Will Saudi Arabia Go Nuclear With An Oil Supply Shock?”, <http://www.oilandenergydaily.com/2013/07/30/saudi-arabia-oil-supply/>, AW)

The big advantage that Saudi Arabia has over the United States is that its oil is cheaper to extract. You see, Saudi oil sits very close to the surface and it’s not embedded in rock the way shale oil is. It doesn’t carry the added costs of labor and technology. All told, it only costs about $20 per barrel to extract, compared to the $80 to $90 per barrel it costs to get oil from shale. So Saudi Arabia and others could withstand much lower oil prices, whereas U.S. producers would be forced to cut their production if the price of crude fell to, say, $70 per barrel. Now, with oil trading over $100 per barrel, that’s not a problem… yet. But as we recently pointed out, oil prices are much higher than they should be right now. Fundamentally speaking, prices should be $20 to $30 lower. And if U.S. production continues to increase at its current pace, they will be. So what will happen if Saudi Arabia and other OPEC countries attempt to drive them lower by raising production? Prices would collapse to the point that producing oil from shale would be a money-losing endeavor. Think it can’t happen? Think again. Saudi Arabia is home to the world’s most prolific, consistent daily production of crude oil and the second-largest reserves in the world. The kingdom currently produces 12.5 million barrels per day. It has the capacity to produce another 2.5 million barrels per day. There just isn’t enough demand at current prices. Through its influence over OPEC, it can pretty much set the price for more than one third of the world’s daily oil usage of around 100 million barrels. So even if it doesn’t sell as much oil to the United States – most of our imports come from Canada, Venezuela and Mexico – Saudi Arabia is still a major factor in the price of the oil that we consume. More importantly, the Saudi royal family will do anything to maintain their grip on their kingdom, as well as their own personal power, prestige and wealth. If that means selling oil at a loss, so be it. The kingdom has NO other source of income and NO other choice. If Saudi Arabia were to feel a genuine threat, it could open the spigot and flood the market… literally. The other OPEC members would follow suit, as most are in the same boat as Saudi Arabia – with no other source of revenue and leaderships that are dependent on the largesse from oil sales. And if you want to get an idea of what can happen in an industry when supply increases faster than demand, or when prices plunge by more than half, just look at what happened to natural gas prices over the past decade. Wells sit idle and companies cut back production. So while oil may be trading at $106 per barrel today, it could just as easily be trading at half that price a few years from now, and that’s not even counting the increasing downward pressure from alternative energy sources like natural gas.

### 2NC – Cuba

#### Plan unlocks Cuban reserves – massively increases oil production – that spikes prices – prefer our evidence – it’s contexualized to the way CUBA affects GLOBAL MARKET PRICES – that’s Cala

#### **Lifting the embargo is the only way to increase drilling in Cuba**

Gould, 9 – (Jens Erik Gould, Associated Press Staff Writer for Bloomberg. April 3, 2009. “Cuba Would Welcome U.S. Oil Companies If Embargo Ends (Update2),” http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=anxecGjW.7\_U)//SDL

April 3 (Bloomberg) -- Cuba would welcome U.S. companies’ help developing its oil industry should the 47-year trade embargo on the communist island come to an end, said Manuel Marrero Faz, senior oil adviser at the Ministry of Basic Industries.¶ “We are open,” said Marrero Faz, noting that Chinese, Russian and Angolan companies are in talks to explore areas about 100 miles off the U.S. coast. “We’re very close to each other. We’re neighbors. Why not do business?”¶ Should nearby U.S. companies offer services and supplies, Cuba would be able to lower its costs and pick up the pace of development, said Marrero Faz, who learned geology as a student in the former Soviet Union. The difficulty of getting equipment from partners halfway around the world is a key reason only one offshore well has been drilled so far, he said.¶ Marrero Faz’s comments represent one of the strongest signals yet that Cuban President Raul Castro is ready for a new relationship with the U.S. under President Barack Obama. In Washington, Cuba’s incipient oil industry is helping fuel a growing campaign to ease the trade embargo that President John F. Kennedy imposed in 1962 to try to topple Fidel Castro’s Soviet-allied regime.¶ U.S. business interests -- watching from the sidelines as global competitors scoop up contracts -- as well as lawmakers and policy groups are becoming more vocal that the time for a change has come.¶ ‘Taking the Fields’¶ “It’s stupid that the U.S. prohibits its companies from coming here,” said Gustavo Echeverria, a researcher at Cuba’s Center for Petroleum Investigation, who spoke after giving a presentation at a Havana oil conference last month. “Everyone else is taking the fields on its doorstep.”

#### The embargo prevents US drilling in Cuba.

Coral Davenport, 2011 (staff writer, NATIONAL JOURNAL, July 29, 2011. Retrieved Apr. 21, 2013 from <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/will-sloppy-drilling-off-the-coast-of-cuba-threaten-florida-gulf-beaches--20110728>, Accessed 7/19/2013, rwg)

Because of the embargo, U.S. companies cannot drill in Cuba, supply equipment to Cuba, have any say over safety regulations in Cuba, or even take part in helping control a blowout and spill in Cuba. As the island prepares to begin offshore drilling, it has signed contracts with oil companies from Brazil, India, Italy, Russia, and Spain—and is in talks to lease major portions of its coastal water to Chinese companies (continuing China’s pattern of pursuing oil exploration in countries where U.S. drillers aren’t welcome).

### A2 diversification

#### High oil prices key to Russian economy – half of government revenue is from oil – reliance is still high – that’s Schuman 12.

#### Declining oil prices trigger economic crisis in Russia

**Bush, 12 –** (Jason Bush, Associated Press Staff Writer for Reuters. July 2, 2012. “Oil-price slide highlights risks to Putin's Russia,” http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/07/02/uk-russia-oil-idUKLNE86102820120702)//SDL

Falling oil prices could trigger a prolonged slump in Russia that would lay bare the growing fiscal risks, threatening President Vladimir Putin's election promise to increase wages and fanning public discontent.¶ The world's largest oil producer is well-placed in the short run to withstand sliding prices, thanks to sizeable cash reserves and a flexible rouble. An d P u tin, who returned to the Kremlin after March's election, is still widely popular.¶ But the oil price has fallen by over $30 dollars in the last three months, to close to $90 per barrel, and may fall further, narrowing his room for budgetary manoeuvre just as mass protests have underscored dissatisfaction with the government.¶ "This is not the best start for the new government," said Peter Westin, chief strategist Aton brokerage in Moscow.¶ "If the oil price is temporarily at these levels, or even lower, it's not a huge problem. The issue is whether it stays there."¶ Oil and gas taxes account for around half of revenues raised by the federal budget, which Putin, as prime minister, used to boost public sector pay and pensions as a way of overcoming the 2009 economic slump.¶ Putin, who has taken a more populist approach to dealing with his declining popularity, promised even more public sector pay rises as part of his election campaign.¶ While that would cushion the immediate blow of any slowdown, running down the fiscal reserves to maintain high social spending would only increase Russia's long-term vulnerability to yet another oil price shock.¶ "In the short term they can sustain a very low oil price, but they need to address the structural problems in health, education and pensions," said Ivan Tchakarov, chief Russia economist at Renaissance Capital.¶ "This is not a sustainable fiscal policy, there's no question about it."¶ DEPENDENCY¶ The last time oil prices fell so precipitously, in 2009, Russia's economy slumped by a dramatic 8 percent. Collapsing oil was also a catalyst for Russia's 1998 economic crisis that ended in devaluation and default.¶ Putin, in his annual statement on the budget on Thursday, acknowledged that Russia's reliance on energy prices was one of its biggest policy headaches.¶ "The Russian budgetary system is highly dependent on the situation on world commodity markets," he said. "This limits the opportunities for budget manoeuvre."¶ For now, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov has earmarked $6 billion that could be spent in 2012 f rom a budget rainy-day fund should a deteriorating global economy drag on growth in Russia.¶ "We hope we don't have to make use of these measures, because the steps being taken by the government and central bank are sufficient," Siluanov said.¶ He trimmed his 2013 budget deficit forecast to 1.5 percent of gross domestic product, assuming an average oil price of $97 per barrel. The fiscal plan will help keep the national debt, now around 10 percent of GDP, manageably low.¶ BUFFER¶ Analysts say the impact on Russia of lower oil prices may be milder than during previous falls.¶ "In the short term, in the next one to three years, we are fine," said Tchakarov.¶ He noted that according to Finance Ministry calculations, every one dollar fall in the oil price means that the government loses around 55 billion roubles in oil-related taxes over the course of a year.¶ With the budget presently balancing at around $115 per barrel, an oil price of $90 per barrel, if sustained over a full year, would leave the government short to the tune of around $40 billion a year.¶ But that is still just a fraction of the $185 billion that Russia has stashed away in two fiscal reserve funds, designed to stabilise the budget in just such an emergency.¶ Even at $60 per barrel - the average oil price during the crisis year of 2009 - the reserve funds could cover the shortfall for about two years.¶ "I find this worrying about the budget at this moment a little beside the point," said Clemens Grafe, chief Russia economist at Goldman Sachs.¶ "The fiscal buffers they have to absorb this are going to be sufficient without cutting expenditure."¶ Analysts also point out that since the previous financial crisis in 2008-2009, the central bank has radically changed the exchange rate regime, allowing the rouble to fall in line with the cheaper oil price.¶ Since oil began its latest slide in mid-March, the rouble has lost around 15 percent of its value against the dollar.¶ "The rouble weakened exactly in line with the oil price. And a weaker rouble is very good because it will secure the rouble equivalent of oil taxes for the budget," said Evgeny Gavrilenkov, chief economist at Troika Dialog.¶ SIGNIFICANT SLOWDOWN¶ Despite these buffers, most economists expect that a sustained fall in the oil price would cause a significant slowdown in Russia's economic growth - still a surprisingly resilient 4.2 percent in May.¶ "Between $70 and $80 per barrel you will have a recession," said Westin from Aton.¶ Russia's ability to maintain government spending is limited by the so called non-oil deficit - a measure of the underlying state of the budget once oil taxes are removed - that has ballooned from 5 percent of gross domestic product in 2008 to over 10 percent this year.¶ Even before the latest decline in the oil price, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank were urging Russia to scale back this underlying deficit by cutting down on bloated government spending.¶ In a recent interview with Reuters, Russia's deputy prime minister Igor Shuvalov vowed that while the government intended to use its reserves to maintain expenditures this year, next year's budget would be "very frugal, tight and responsible".¶ That implies that sooner or later, falling oil prices will force cutbacks that will hit the pockets of ordinary Russians.¶ "The silver lining of a failing oil price is that it does increase the urgency of social reform and budget cuts," says Kingsmill Bond, chief Russia strategist at Citigroup.

## Credibility

### 2nc Multilat fails

#### 1) Implementation – it’s good in theory but not practice

**Multilat fails**

**Holmes 10—**VP, foreign policy and defense studies, Heritage. Frmr Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. While at the State Department, Holmes was responsible for developing policy and coordinating U.S. engagement at the United Nations and 46 other international organizations. Member of the CFR. Frmr adjunct prof of history, Georgetown. PhD in history, Georgetown (Kim, Smart Multilateralism and the United Nations, 21 Sept. 2010, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/smart-multilateralism-when-and-when-not-to-rely-on-the-united-nations, AMiles)

The need for multilateralism is obvious. Nations share concerns about many problems and issues for which coordinated efforts could be mutually beneficial. Yet only rarely do all governments agree on the nature of a problem and the means to address it. At times, negotiations result in a less-than-perfect, but still acceptable, course of action. Disagreements can also lead to no action or the use of force or other confrontational measures. One of the purposes of multilateralism is to minimize the number and intensity of such confrontations. The process itself, however, is fraught with political challenges that can undermine potential solutions and even lead to other problems. For the United States, multilateralism faces its greatest challenge at the United Nations, where U.S. diplomats seek cooperative action among member nations on serious international problems. Therein lies the tension. The United Nations is first and foremost a political body made up of 192 states that rarely agree on any one issue. Even fundamental issues, such as protecting and observing human rights, a key purpose of the U.N. that all member states pledge to uphold when they join it, have become matters of intense debate. A key reason for this difficulty is the fact that the voices and votes of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes have equal weight to those of free nations at the U.N. The all-too-frequent clash of worldviews between liberty and authoritarian socialism has stymied multilateralism more than facilitated it, frequently **leading to institutional paralysis** when a unified response to grave threats to peace and security or human rights and fundamental freedoms was needed. U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles, who attended the San Francisco meetings that established the U.N., acknowledged this Achilles’ heel in 1954, when he told reporters: “The United Nations was not set up to be a reformatory. It was assumed that you would be good before you got in and not that being in would make you good.”[1] Fifty-five years later, the ideological fray at the U.N. has turned the terms “democracy” and “freedom” on their heads. Autocracies that deny democratic liberties at home are all too keen to call the Security Council “undemocratic” because in their view not every region, country, or bloc is sufficiently represented. During my time at the State Department, I was told repeatedly by other diplomats at the U.N. that the very concept of “freedom” is taboo because the term is “too ideologically charged.” In this environment, how can the United States or any freedom-loving country advance the purposes set forth in the U.N. Charter, including “encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all,”[2] when the word “freedom” itself is considered too controversial? More money will not do it. No other nation contributes more to the U.N.’s regular budget, its peacekeeping budget, or the budgets of its myriad affiliated organizations and activities than the United States. America has continued its generous support even though Americans increasingly view the U.N. as inefficient and ineffective at best and fraudulent, wasteful, anti-American, and beyond reform at worst.[3] If the United States is to advance its many interests in the world, it needs to pursue multilateral diplomacy in a smarter, more pragmatic manner. This is especially true when Washington is considering actions taken through the United Nations. A decision to engage multilaterally should meet two criteria: First, it should be in America’s interests, and second, it will serve to advance liberty. Unless the United States can achieve both these ends acting within the U.N. system, it should find ways to work around it. Such “smart multilateralism” is not easy, particularly in multilateral settings. It requires politically savvy leaders who can overcome decades-old bureaucratic inertia at the State Department and in international organizations. **It requires the political will and diplomatic skill** of people who are dedicated to advancing U.S. interests in difficult environments, especially where progress will likely be slow and incremental. It requires a belief in the cause of liberty, gleaned from a thorough study of our nation’s history and the U.S. Constitution, and a deep appreciation for the values and principles that have made America great. Smart multilateralism requires a fundamental awareness of the strengths and weaknesses, capabilities and failings, of the U.N. and other multilateral negotiating forums, so that the United States does not overreach. Perhaps the most critical decision is whether or not to take a matter to the U.N. in the first place. It would be better to restrict U.S. engagement at the U.N. to situations in which success is possible or engagement will strengthen America’s influence and reputation. Selective engagement increases the potential for success, and success breeds success. When America is perceived to be a skillful and judicious multilateral player, it finds it easier to press its case. Smart multilateralism thus requires well-formulated and clear policy positions and a willingness to hold countries accountable when their votes do not align with our interests. Finally, smart multilateralism is not the same thing as “smart power,” a term that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has used. Suzanne Nossell, a former diplomat at the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in New York, coined that term in 2004 and described it in an article in Foreign Affairs.[4] Smart power is seen as a takeoff of “soft power,” which suggests that America’s leaders downplay the nation’s military might as well as its historic role in establishing an international system based on the values of liberty and democracy, and de-emphasize its immense economic and military (“hard”) power. Smart power seeks to persuade other countries from a position of assumed equality among nations. This assumption has become the Achilles’ heel of the U.N. system and other Cold War–era organizations. Smart multilateralism does not make that same mistake. Challenges to Effective U.S. Multilateralism The United States belongs to dozens of multilateral organizations, from large and well-known organizations such as NATO, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund to relatively small niche organizations such as the Universal Postal Union and the International Bureau of Weights and Measures. The 2009 congressional budget justification[5] for the U.S. Department of State included line items for U.S. contributions to some fifty distinct international organizations and budgets.[6] The United Nations and its affiliated bodies receive the lion’s share of these contributions. While the World Bank and International Monetary Fund weight voting based on contributions, most of these organizations subscribe to the notion of the equality of nations’ votes. With a few exceptions such as Taiwan,[7] all nations—no matter how small or large, free or repressed, rich or poor—have a seat at the U.N. table. Every nation’s vote is equal, despite great differences in geographic size, population, military or economic power, and financial contributions. This one-country, one-vote principle makes the U.N. an extremely difficult venue in which to wage successful multilateral diplomacy. In this environment, multilateralism becomes a double-edged sword. It can sometimes speed up global responses to global problems, as with the avian flu outbreak and the Asian tsunami. At other times, it can slow or prevent timely responses, as with halting Iran’s nuclear weapons program and stopping genocide in Darfur. Too often, multilateralism at the U.N. is the political means by which other countries and regional blocs constrain or block action. Groups of small nations can join together to outvote the great powers on key issues, and this situation can often lead to bizarre outcomes and compromises. Even seemingly noncontroversial issues, such as improving auditing of U.N. expenditures, require days of skillful, almost nonstop negotiations. The U.N. is simply too poorly primed for American multilateralism. It is a vast labyrinth of agencies, offices, committees, commissions, programs, and funds, often with overlapping and duplicative missions.[8] Lines of accountability and responsibility for specific issues or efforts are complex, confused, and often indecipherable. For example, dozens of U.N. bodies focus on development, the environment, and children’s and women’s issues. Coordination is minimal. Reliable means to assess the effectiveness of the bodies’ independent activities is practically nonexistent. Although institutional fiefdoms and bureaucratic interests strongly influence the formulation of U.N. policy, programs, and resolutions, the most powerful actors remain the member states. Each tries to persuade the U.N. as an institution to advocate and adopt its positions on the matters most important to it. The chaos of conflicting priorities rarely results in consensus for decisive action. The most common result is inaction or a lowest-common-denominator outcome. Too often, the United States also finds that other countries’ positions on an issue have been predetermined in their regional or political groupings. These groupings include the European Union; the G-77, or Group of 77 (which is really a caucus of some 130 countries, including China, Iran, and Cuba); the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); the African Union (AU); the Arab League; and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Some countries participate in several of these blocs. Added to this mix is heavy lobbying by “civil society” special interest groups, especially on contentious causes, which helps to explain why the United States faces an uphill battle in successfully husbanding any policy proposal through the U.N. system. Perhaps the most stunning example came under President Bill Clinton, when the United States was trying to negotiate changes to the Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court (ICC), so that the United States could sign it. Intense lobbying by nongovernmental organizations at the proceedings culminated in dramatic cheering when 120 countries voted in favor of the statute despite U.S. objections.[9] Of course, the most difficult forum for negotiating multilateral solutions is the Security Council, where the most serious security matters are raised and the greatest failures of multilateralism have occurred. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union largely shut down the council with its veto. As a result, the United States conducted most of its international affairs outside of the U.N., yet very few complaints of unilateralism were heard. That changed when the Soviet Union dissolved, and the hope was that the U.N. would at last become a force for good in the world. Instead, new rivalries have emerged that undermine its effectiveness. Perhaps the most frustrating development for U.S. multilateralism at the U.N. in the post–Cold War era has been the inability of the United States to develop a shared position with some of its best friends in Europe. Often, the allies say that they cannot negotiate with the United States until the European Union has taken a “common European position.” Yet after that common position has been adopted, individual European countries claim far less flexibility to negotiate. The EU also has been known to strong-arm its allies as well as its member states to oppose U.S. positions. For example, on the issue of genocide in Darfur, I witnessed the EU’s most visible leaders pressing the United States to accept the ICC as the international judicial authority to try war crimes committed in Sudan, rather than setting up an ad hoc tribunal. Furthermore, they leaned on Romania to go along with their position, even threatening Romania with punitive action if it did not. Countries hostile to the United States and to economic and political freedoms can and do take full advantage of this crack in the West’s once-unified front. Sometimes, though, the United States is its own worst enemy. Intense interagency discussions must take place before the State Department sends out any instruction cable to its negotiators at the U.N. and diplomats in capitals. Such delays can be costly because they give other countries time to sway votes against the U.S. position, leaving U.S. negotiators with little time to convince others to change their minds. For U.S. negotiators, this process can blur not only the clarity of purpose, but also policy objectives. Even after the State Department, Defense Department, and National Security Council hammer out a policy, U.S. diplomats are sometimes simply unable to advance it. Many who are fairly new to the negotiations must deal with counterparts from other countries who have worked the same issue in international settings for years. Some U.S. diplomats would rather settle for consensus than work for an outcome in which the U.S. will be isolated and which places America alongside pariah states such as Zimbabwe or Sudan, even if those countries voted with the United States for starkly different reasons.

#### 2) GOP and partisanship block functional effectiveness

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Now that Republicans have taken back the House of Representatives and seem to be preparing to thwart U.S. President Barack Obama's domestic-policy agenda, the White House may be tempted to look to foreign policy to achieve some victories in the coming year, as well as a means of achieving a measure of cooperation with a seemingly intransigent GOP.

But if that is the administration's strategy, **it's likely to fall flat. On most, if not all, of Obama's top foreign-policy action items, a more powerful, less accommodating Congress appears ready to throw additional roadblocks in his way.**

As a top GOP congressional aide told FP's The Cable, "You are going to see more aggressiveness to push an agenda and not to defer to the administration."

#### 3) Chinese belligerence

**Schneider, 11** 1/27 – assistant professor of Chinese at University of Massachusetts, Amherst (David K., “China and the Realities of Power in Asia,” http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/ISN-Insights/Detail?lng=en&id=126468&contextid734=126468&contextid735=126467&tabid=126467, JMP)

US-China relations over the past two years have been a tale of two diplomacies. Secretary of State Clinton and Deputy Secretary Steinberg have been promoting a new American leadership designed to create "a new global architecture" that will "help integrate emerging powers into an international community with clear obligations and expectations." American diplomacy, according to this vision, will help China and the other emerging nations to overcome the mistrust and suspicion that blocks international cooperation and burden sharing. The rise of a new global middle class and a shared sense of common threat and common interest will open new opportunities to make China and other emerging powers global and regional "anchors of stability" that cooperate, under American leadership, to uphold international law and universal rights. Yet, sharp ground-level exchanges over Iran, naval activities in the Yellow, East, and South China Seas and the valuation of the yuan are clear signs that the interests of the two powers are growing **increasingly divergent**. The **inevitable failure** to realize this vision of great power condominium will not be due to mistrust, an inability to see common interests, or, as many suggest, the interference of domestic politics on both sides, but rather to the changing, and clashing, long-term realities of power in Asia. A concert of great powers can work only if all parties agree on the political composition of the global order, and are satisfied with the distribution of military and economic power. This was the case in the European order from the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 to the beginning of the Crimean War in 1853 - Metternich's Concert of Europe. Contemporary Asia is in no way similar. Beijing and Washington do not share a common vision of the global political order. A critical mass of non-democratic governments, especially around its periphery, is geopolitically vital for China. These political imperatives underlie Beijing's consistent refusal to cooperate with the United States' proposed P5+1 alignment against the Iranian nuclear program. Maximum control over events in Central Asia has for centuries been essential to China's security. Threats to China's stability and even political existence traditionally have come from this region. The Han, Tang, Song and Qing dynasties were all fatally weakened upon the loss of this region to non-Chinese tribes and Arab powers. In the twentieth century, tensions and clashes with Soviet power along China's northern and western borders were a major factor in driving Beijing toward strategic entente with America in the 1970's. Ever since the demise of the USSR, Beijing has been striving to integrate Central Asia into its political and economic orbit, with the strategic objective of preventing the penetration of any political influences that might destabilize Xinjiang and Tibet, or leave China vulnerable to military coercion. Iran is the geopolitical anchor of this system. Sanctions that might lead to regime change in Tehran would threaten that order, and thereby, eventually, China's own internal security. Similar political realities have undermined another Washington attempt at a concert of powers, the Six Party Talks concerning the North Korean nuclear program. The Korean Peninsula is the strategic key to Manchuria and to China's coastal security. The 1894 Sino-Japanese War was a contest between the two powers for influence in Korea. China's loss led to a weakened Qing position in Manchuria and along the coast that invited further aggression from Japan, Russia and the European powers. In the Korean War in the 1950s, China spent, by some estimates, over a million lives to keep North Korea in existence and in the Sino-Soviet sphere. Beijing is unlikely to take any action to undermine a regime that acts as a buffer against the United States, South Korea and Japan. Recent events show the opposite. China has boosted its economic aid and investment programs in North Korea, and Beijing has been particularly reluctant to use its considerable leverage over Pyongyang to force concessions on its nuclear weapons program. Indeed, Kim Jong Il's recent visit to China, just as he is working to effect a smooth leadership transition, indicates that Beijing will remain deeply invested in the present North Korean regime. In military terms, China is clearly a revisionist power, profoundly dissatisfied with the present Asian security system, a reality that will **seriously limit prospects for any architecture of collective security.** America projects power in Asia through military alliances with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, as well as through a new strategic relationship with India, and a system of bases in South Korea, Japan, Guam, and Diego Garcia that keeps the sea lanes open, maintains stability on the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, and, in a larger frame, between China and Japan. The People's Republic has always viewed this reality as strategic encirclement. China's challenge to this order is accelerating with its new-found economic power. Beijing has declared the South China Sea a "core national interest" and has moved to enforce its territorial claims to the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyutai Islands in Chinese), and the Spratly Islands, and to other economic resources in the Western Pacific, particularly oil. All of these actions are provocations against American allies and friends in the Pacific. Beijing is moreover beginning to back up these moves with the development and deployment of the naval power necessary to make them credible and lasting. China is developing a new anti-ship ballistic missile that can hit ships as far away as 1,000 miles, and is far more effective than a cruise missile. New weapons, plans to field a blue-water navy, complete with aircraft carriers, and new maritime relationships with Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, are vivid signs that Beijing intends to assert itself not just as a regional hegemon, but as a naval power capable of operating all the way from the North Pacific to the Arabian Sea. Despite talk of joint U.S.-Chinese management of the global economy, Beijing has not embraced liberal capitalism. Markets are tools of the state being used to boost the efficiency of an otherwise inefficient socialist system, and not yet the foundation of a liberal, free market, economy. Full Chinese compatibility with world trade and financial norms would require interest rate liberalization, the free flow of capital, deregulation and privatization, protection of property rights, market exchange rates, and international trade and financial liberalization. Beijing has yet to fully harmonize with any of these norms. China's interest rates are determined by the state; the stock and capital markets are not fully open; the state still commands the largest sectors of heavy industry, transportation, communications and banking-what Lenin called the "commanding heights;" property rights do not inhere in the individual; land rights are not fully transferable; the yuan exchange rate is pegged to the dollar; and, although a WTO member, Beijing has proposed and negotiated with regional and other powers a number of trade agreements that do not adhere to WTO principles.

## National Security

### 2nc No Terror

#### The status quo is no longer threatening — sponsoring terrorism was a Chávez-led doctrine — that dies out with Maduro

Ghitis 13 — independent commentator on world affairs and a World Politics Review contributing editor (Frida Ghitis, *World Politics Review*, 01-10-13, “World Citizen: Will Venezuela-Iran Links Survive Chávez?”, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12615/world-citizen-will-venezuela-iran-links-survive-chavez>, Accessed 06-30-2013)

During almost 14 years in office, Chávez made anti-Americanism the cornerstone of his foreign policy, working at every step to antagonize U.S. goals and undermine Washington’s influence. Perhaps the greatest irritant of all was the close relationship he forged with Iran, a country the U.S. and its allies believe is trying to develop nuclear weapons and sponsoring international terrorism. As the U.S. spearheaded efforts to pass United Nations sanctions to stop Iran’s nuclear enrichment, Chávez traveled to Tehran and, along with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, provocatively announced the creation of what they called an “Axis of Unity” against the U.S. The two countries work together in a number of areas. Of particular interest to the U.S. is Venezuela’s help to Iran in circumventing international sanctions. The question for Washington now is how to maximize the chances that once Chávez leaves the scene, the ties linking Caracas and Tehran, more than 7,000 miles away, will fade. Just before the end of the year, President Barack Obama signed into law the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act, which instructs the State Department to develop a strategy to “address Iran’s growing hostile presence and activity” in Latin America, and directs the Department of Homeland Security to take measures to protect U.S. borders with Mexico and Canada to keep out “operatives from Iran . . . Hezbollah or any other terrorist organizations.” For Iran and its Lebanese ally Hezbollah, Chávez’s worsening condition could not come at a worse time. Their closest and most crucial ally, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, is engulfed in a brutal civil war, likely to put an end to his regime and possibly destroy Syria’s ties with Iran and Hezbollah. The headwinds they face in Latin America recently came up in a speech by none other than Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Speaking a couple of days after the start of the year, Nasrallah said 2013 would bring a “very dangerous phase” for his organization, citing efforts to add the group to the European Union’s terrorist list and to restrict its movements in Latin America as specific challenges. Before traveling to Cuba for his most recent cancer surgery, Chávez dramatically acknowledged he may not be able to remain in power and anointed Vice President Nicolas Maduro as his chosen successor. Washington has already taken tentative steps, seeking to reach out to Maduro -- as has Tehran. It is not exactly clear what the American strategy is, but there is no indication that the first moves were effective or well-received. The U.S. said that a telephone conversation between Maduro and a top State Department official, Roberta Jacobson, was aimed at improving relations, and there have been reports of other bilateral contacts. However, Maduro lashed out at reports that relations with Washington would improve after Chávez dies, calling it a distortion and manipulation by Washington. At about the same time, Iranian media reported a telephone call between Maduro and Ahmadinejad. The two are already friends. Maduro has strong connections with Tehran, having met in person with top officials on many occasions during visits to Iran and having served as their host when they traveled to Venezuela. Maduro is a favorite to succeed Chávez in both Tehran and Havana, not to mention Caracas. The Venezuelan constitution says if the president dies or cannot take office, the head of the National Assembly would take power temporarily. That position is held by another Chávez loyalist, Diosdado Cabello. After 30 days, a new election would take place. Cabello and Maduro are just two of several Chávez supporters who would vie for power in the factional power struggles to succeed the iconic president. Chávez’s unqualified blessing means that for now Maduro is the country’s most powerful man. He would benefit from an initial surge of support. And there is no question he and the Chavista forces have a firm grip on all the institutions of power. Chávez’s entrenched United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) will not crumble without its leader. And yet, there is no denying that Chavismo thrived because of Chávez. There is no guarantee it will survive without him in the long term, especially in the face of daunting economic problems, beginning with a budget deficit that stands at an astonishing 20 percent of GDP. For Washington, this means that forging ties with Maduro risks strengthening him against his rivals, helping him quash internal rivals and legitimize his rule at a time when it is unclear just how closely he and other Chavistas plan to follow the constitution. Infighting within the ruling party’s ranks, and the lack of a candidate with strong personal appeal, could open the way for the opposition. Opposition leader Henrique Capriles, who mounted a strong campaign against Chávez in last October’s presidential election, is on record saying he would bring a dramatic change in foreign policy, ending arms purchases from Russia, pulling away from China, reviewing oil deals that strengthen other authoritarian regimes in Latin America -- and rethinking controversial links with Iran. Washington would do well to keep conversations at the lowest possible volume, whether with the opposition or other would-be Chávez successors, while openly urging Venezuela to abide by democratic norms. If, in the event Chávez is unable to serve his term for whatever reason, a fair contest is allowed and enough time passes to loosen the emotional power of grief, the Venezuelan people may wake up to the dismal state of their economy, and discover there are better ways to decrease poverty and build lasting prosperity than Chavismo. A close relationship between Iran and Venezuela has always been a geographic and diplomatic oddity, one made possible only because of Chávez’s own worldview. Chávez’s immediate successor will seek to maintain it, but the intensity and impact will be difficult to preserve for long in a post-Chávez Venezuela.

## Ethanol

#### No boost to ag sales – Cuban economy can’t support additional imports, economy in shambles.

Messina 03 – William, Coordinator of Economic Analysis, Department of Food and Resource Economics, Florida Cooperative Extension Service, 2003 U.S.-Cuban Agricultural Trade: Present Realities and Future Prospects1 <http://www.ilfb.org/media/253618/u_of_florida_testimony_on_cuba.pdf>

Some have argued that a relaxation of the cash sale provisions of the TSRA legislation to allow U.S. firms to offer credit sales would significantly boost U.S. sales of agricultural and food products to Cuba. However, that fails to take into consideration the economic realities in Cuba. The Cuban economy is a shambles and it faces serious hard currency shortages as a result of its ever-escalating trade deficit.

## Security

#### our response is to interrogate the epistemological failures of the 1ac---this is the only way to solve inevitable extinction

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While recommendations to shift our frame of orientation away from conventional state-centrism toward a 'human security' approach are valid, this cannot be achieved without confronting the deeper theoretical assumptions underlying conventional approaches to 'non-traditional' security issues.106 By occluding the structural origin and systemic dynamic of global ecological, energy and economic crises, orthodox approaches are incapable of transforming them. Coupled with their excessive state-centrism, this means they operate largely at the level of 'surface' impacts of global crises in terms of how they will affect quite traditional security issues relative to sustaining state integrity, such as international terrorism, violent conflict and population movements. Global crises end up fuelling the projection of risk onto social networks, groups and countries that cross the geopolitical fault-lines of these 'surface' impacts - which happen to intersect largely with Muslim communities. Hence, regions particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts, containing large repositories of hydrocarbon energy resources, or subject to demographic transformations in the context of rising population pressures, have become the focus of state security planning in the context of counter-terrorism operations abroad.

The intensifying problematisation and externalisation of Muslim-majority regions and populations by Western security agencies - as a discourse - is therefore not only interwoven with growing state perceptions of global crisis acceleration, but driven ultimately by an epistemological failure to interrogate the systemic causes of this acceleration in collective state policies (which themselves occur in the context of particular social, political and economic structures). This expansion of militarisation is thus coeval with the subliminal normative presumption that the social relations of the perpetrators, in this case Western states, must be protected and perpetuated at any cost - precisely because the efficacy of the prevailing geopolitical and economic order is ideologically beyond question.

As much as this analysis highlights a direct link between global systemic crises, social polarisation and state militarisation, it fundamentally undermines the idea of a symbiotic link between natural resources and conflict per se. Neither 'resource shortages' nor 'resource abundance' (in ecological, energy, food and monetary terms) necessitate conflict by themselves.

There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to conflict. The first is the extent to which either condition can generate socio-political crises that challenge or undermine the prevailing order. The second is the way in which stakeholder actors choose to actually respond to the latter crises. To understand these factors accurately requires close attention to the political, economic and ideological strictures of resource exploitation, consumption and distribution between different social groups and classes. Overlooking the systematic causes of social crisis leads to a heightened tendency to problematise its symptoms, in the forms of challenges from particular social groups. This can lead to externalisation of those groups, and the legitimisation of violence towards them.

Ultimately, this systems approach to global crises strongly suggests that conventional policy 'reform' is woefully inadequate. Global warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a civilisation which is in overshoot. The current scale and organisation of human activities is breaching the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which industrial civilisation is embedded. This breach is now increasingly visible in the form of two interlinked crises in global food production and the global financial system. In short, industrial civilisation in its current form is unsustainable. This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic transformation.

Yet conventional theoretical and policy approaches fail to (1) fully engage with the gravity of research in the natural sciences and (2) translate the social science implications of this research in terms of the embeddedness of human social systems in natural systems. Hence, lacking capacity for epistemological self-reflection and inhibiting the transformative responses urgently required, they reify and normalise mass violence against diverse 'Others', newly constructed as traditional security threats enormously amplified by global crises - a process that guarantees the intensification and globalisation of insecurity on the road to ecological, energy and economic catastrophe. Such an outcome, of course, is not inevitable, but extensive new transdisciplinary research in IR and the wider social sciences - drawing on and integrating human and critical security studies, political ecology, historical sociology and historical materialism, while engaging directly with developments in the natural sciences - is urgently required to develop coherent conceptual frameworks which could inform more sober, effective, and joined-up policy-making on these issues.

### Education – the roll of the scholar is to question methodology first – securitized methodology is unethical

Shampa Biswas 7 Prof of Politics @ Whitman “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist” Millennium 36 (1) p. 117-125

The recent resuscitation of the project of Empire should give International Relations scholars particular pause.1 For a discipline long premised on a triumphant Westphalian sovereignty, there should be something remarkable about the ease with which the case for brute force, regime change and empire-building is being formulated in widespread commentary spanning the political spectrum. Writing after the 1991 Gulf War, Edward Said notes the US hesitance to use the word ‘empire’ despite its long imperial history.2 This hesitance too is increasingly under attack as even self-designated liberal commentators such as Michael Ignatieff urge the US to overcome its unease with the ‘e-word’ and selfconsciously don the mantle of imperial power, contravening the limits of sovereign authority and remaking the world in its universalist image of ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’.3 Rashid Khalidi has argued that the US invasion and occupation of Iraq does indeed mark a new stage in American world hegemony, replacing the indirect and proxy forms of Cold War domination with a regime much more reminiscent of European colonial empires in the Middle East.4 The ease with which a defence of empire has been mounted and a colonial project so unabashedly resurrected makes this a particularly opportune, if not necessary, moment, as scholars of ‘the global’, to take stock of our disciplinary complicities with power, to account for colonialist imaginaries that are lodged at the heart of a discipline ostensibly interested in power but perhaps far too deluded by the formal equality of state sovereignty and overly concerned with security and order. Perhaps more than any other scholar, Edward Said’s groundbreaking work in Orientalism has argued and demonstrated the long and deep complicity of academic scholarship with colonial domination.5 In addition to spawning whole new areas of scholarship such as postcolonial studies, Said’s writings have had considerable influence in his own discipline of comparative literature but also in such varied disciplines as anthropology, geography and history, all of which have taken serious and sustained stock of their own participation in imperial projects and in fact regrouped around that consciousness in a way that has simply not happened with International Relations.6 It has been 30 years since Stanley Hoffman accused IR of being an ‘American social science’ and noted its too close connections to US foreign policy elites and US preoccupations of the Cold War to be able to make any universal claims,7 yet there seems to be a curious amnesia and lack of curiosity about the political history of the discipline, and in particular its own complicities in the production of empire.8 Through what discourses the imperial gets reproduced, resurrected and re-energised is a question that should be very much at the heart of a discipline whose task it is to examine the contours of global power. Thinking this failure of IR through some of Edward Said’s critical scholarly work from his long distinguished career as an intellectual and activist, this article is an attempt to politicise and hence render questionable the disciplinary traps that have, ironically, circumscribed the ability of scholars whose very business it is to think about global politics to actually think globally and politically. What Edward Said has to offer IR scholars, I believe, is a certain kind of global sensibility, a critical but sympathetic and felt awareness of an inhabited and cohabited world. Furthermore, it is a profoundly political sensibility whose globalism is predicated on a cognisance of the imperial and a firm non-imperial ethic in its formulation. I make this argument by travelling through a couple of Said’s thematic foci in his enormous corpus of writing. Using a lot of Said’s reflections on the role of public intellectuals, I argue in this article that IR scholars need to develop what I call a ‘global intellectual posture’. In the 1993 Reith Lectures delivered on BBC channels, Said outlines three positions for public intellectuals to assume – as an outsider/exile/marginal, as an ‘amateur’, and as a disturber of the status quo speaking ‘truth to power’ and self-consciously siding with those who are underrepresented and disadvantaged.9 Beginning with a discussion of Said’s critique of ‘professionalism’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ as it applies to International Relations, I first argue the importance, for scholars of global politics, of taking politics seriously. Second, I turn to Said’s comments on the posture of exile and his critique of identity politics, particularly in its nationalist formulations, to ask what it means for students of global politics to take the global seriously. Finally, I attend to some of Said’s comments on humanism and contrapuntality to examine what IR scholars can learn from Said about feeling and thinking globally concretely, thoroughly and carefully. IR Professionals in an Age of Empire: From ‘International Experts’ to ‘Global Public Intellectuals’ One of the profound effects of the war on terror initiated by the Bush administration has been a significant constriction of a democratic public sphere, which has included the active and aggressive curtailment of intellectual and political dissent and a sharp delineation of national boundaries along with concentration of state power. The academy in this context has become a particularly embattled site with some highly disturbing onslaughts on academic freedom. At the most obvious level, this has involved fairly well-calibrated neoconservative attacks on US higher education that have invoked the mantra of ‘liberal bias’ and demanded legislative regulation and reform10, an onslaught supported by a well-funded network of conservative think tanks, centres, institutes and ‘concerned citizen groups’ within and outside the higher education establishment11 and with considerable reach among sitting legislators, jurists and policy-makers as well as the media. But what has in part made possible the encroachment of such nationalist and statist agendas has been a larger history of the corporatisation of the university and the accompanying ‘professionalisation’ that goes with it. Expressing concern with ‘academic acquiescence in the decline of public discourse in the United States’, Herbert Reid has examined the ways in which the university is beginning to operate as another transnational corporation12, and critiqued the consolidation of a ‘culture of professionalism’ where academic bureaucrats engage in bureaucratic role-playing, minor academic turf battles mask the larger managerial power play on campuses and the increasing influence of a relatively autonomous administrative elite and the rise of insular ‘expert cultures’ have led to academics relinquishing their claims to public space and authority.13 While it is no surprise that the US academy should find itself too at that uneasy confluence of neoliberal globalising dynamics and exclusivist nationalist agendas that is the predicament of many contemporary institutions around the world, there is much reason for concern and an urgent need to rethink the role and place of intellectual labour in the democratic process. This is especially true for scholars of the global writing in this age of globalisation and empire. Edward Said has written extensively on the place of the academy as one of the few and increasingly precarious spaces for democratic deliberation and argued the necessity for public intellectuals immured from the seductions of power.14 Defending the US academy as one of the last remaining utopian spaces, ‘the one public space available to real alternative intellectual practices: no other institution like it on such a scale exists anywhere else in the world today’15, and lauding the remarkable critical theoretical and historical work of many academic intellectuals in a lot of his work, Said also complains that ‘the American University, with its munificence, utopian sanctuary, and remarkable diversity, has defanged (intellectuals)’16. The most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’, he argues, is ‘professionalism’ and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of ‘specializations’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on ‘relatively narrow areas of knowledge’, ‘technical formalism’, ‘impersonal theories and methodologies’, and most worrisome of all, their ability and willingness to be seduced by power.17 Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US academics as ‘organic intellectuals’ involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement has studied US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War made possible and justified through various forms of ‘intellectual articulation’.19 This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but indeed a larger question of intellectual orientation. It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their scholarly conclusions in terms of its relevance for global politics, where ‘relevance’ is measured entirely in terms of policy wisdom. Edward Said’s searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The space for a critical appraisal of the motivations and conduct of this war has been considerably diminished by the expertise-framed national debate wherein certain kinds of ethical questions irreducible to formulaic ‘for or against’ and ‘costs and benefits’ analysis can simply not be raised. In effect, what Said argues for, and IR scholars need to pay particular heed to, is an understanding of ‘intellectual relevance’ that is larger and more worthwhile, that is about the posing of critical, historical, ethical and perhaps unanswerable questions rather than the offering of recipes and solutions, that is about politics (rather than techno-expertise) in the most fundamental and important senses of the vocation.21

## Alt debate

### The alternative does solve – our approach is multiviarble and re-orients our understanding of geopolitics via accounts of identity, culture, and ethnicity, rejecting the affirmative’s static notions of IR - the 1AC is orthodox only seeing the world as a chess board where pieces must move certain ways – the problem is when the pieces don’t move how they want they throw the board against the wall – its try or die – the alternative is feasible

Lal 08 (Prerna P., J.D. Candidate at George Washington Law School, Critical Security Studies, “Deconstructing the National Security State: Towards a New Framework of Analysis,” POSC 4910: Senior Seminar, <http://prernalal.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/css-deconstructing-the-nat-sec-state.pdf>) KENTUCKY

Four years later, amidst the deaths of countless many civilians, a soaring budget deficit, numerous accounts of human rights violations, and the continued rise of “terrorist” networks in many more countries, the “war on terror” is steadily losing support, yet the leaders of the United States continue to carpet bomb Middle-Eastern nations with no end in sight. Hence, it has become critically important to question and reassess the dominant articulation of security as presented by the national security state. This dominant articulation is realism, which has imposed an image of reality upon people that is unrealistic; an image that has been composed and constantly reconsidered, acting as a tool for statist identity construction and economic elites. For the purpose of this paper, all mentions of realism from hereon refers to neo-realism, which is an ideology that presupposes the existence of objective truth and assumes that political conflict and war is a result of the anarchic nature of the international system, where nation-states have to constantly fight to defend their boundaries. In an increasingly complex world, filled with a multitude of different cultures, languages, states and peoples, the traditional neo- realist view of national security is problematic. The problems with realism are many, starting with the fact that (neo)-realism is a misnomer for it is unrealistic and fails to grasp how the world really works. In fact, it is a problem veiled as a problem-solver, wearing the false cloak of objectivity and truth. It assumes that objective truth and knowledge exists independent of our minds; however, the world is not free from our perceptions. As Anais Nin (2005, 5) points out in Critical Security Studies and World Politics, “we do not see things as they are, we see things as we are.” In this case, the “we” are the rulers of the American nation-state, who tout realism as objective truth, in order to create a world more favorable to them. Those with an ideology of domination and an economic interest to dictate, define our reality in terms of their interests. In fact, the construction of this reality is so pervasive that we do not see realism as an ideology, but as a self-evident truth. To accept this constructed reality without questioning is dangerous, for all ideology serves a purpose, and in this case, neo- realism serves the purpose of the state and its elites. Realism also has a narrow and statist agenda that fails to cope with the actual threats to human society. Kenneth Booth (2005, 7), a self-proclaimed fallen realist and head of the Department of International Relations at University of Wales, argues in Critical Security Studies and World Politics that realism offers a massive but narrow agenda, which is “based on the perceived interests of states (and therefore of their elites); this so-called national interest is concerned with maximizing state security, maximizing economic well-being, and protecting the state’s way of life.” Moreover, judging by the high levels of human insecurity that still exists in this world, it is safe to say that realism is a failure for it has empirically failed to deliver security. The threats to human security, which include war, disease, famines, crime, ethnic and religious persecution, violence against women, environmental degradation and so on, take a back-seat because realist notions of security are state-centric. This exclusive lens of international relations is downright regressive for it silences dissidents and minority populations. Women, racial and ethnic minorities, progressives, the working class and their concerns are absent from the realist security agenda. Consequently, an alternative view that questions the dominant paradigm of realism and realist notions of security is desperately needed to provide for human security and emancipation. Methodology: Critical Security Studies The Critical Security Studies (CSS) approach to international relations challenges realism and performatively proves that security is a paradoxical, epistemologically flawed and ontologically unstable concept with no fixed definition. A branch of critical theory, CSS is a broad and diverse field with theorists ranging from critical realists to poststructuralists. However, it is united in its criticism of the neo-realist framework of security, which shall be presented later. Perhaps, Robert Cox (1981, 208) comes closest to discerning the difference between the “realist” problem-solving approach to international relations and critical theory in “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” when he states that the former takes “prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized...as the given framework of action,” while the latter “calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing.” Thus, Critical Security Studies is an unorthodox and questioning outlook to the dominant social and power structure, institutions, and ideologies. Another component of critical theory that differs from realism is that critical theory recognizes “change, the openness of history, and the unfinished nature of the human experiment” (Booth 2005, 12). Therefore, while Critical Security Studies questions prevailing structures and attitudes, it is less concerned with alternatives and more concerned with a deeper understanding of security. Some may reject critical theory for advancing an unsatisfying and incomplete methodology that may not be workable and policy-oriented. However, rejection and rethinking is the first step towards any structural changes. There is no point in advancing a completely alternative framework of security without first changing mindsets by questioning the very nature of security. Furthermore, the very exercise of criticism presents us with a more realistic picture of the world than the present ideology of security as presented by the state (and its elites). Even CSS theorists differ on how to construct alternative models of security, in order to provide for the ultimate goal of the CSS project: human emancipation. CSS scholars are divided into two distinct categories: wideners and deepeners. While wideners claim that the greatest threat to state survival is not military-based, but economic, social and environmental, deepeners focus on the question of whose security is threatened and whether the security project is better achieved with an individual or society-centered referent rather than the state (Krause 1996, 230). The two categories are not mutually-exclusive, and this paper will advance a concept of security that both widens and deepens the field of security studies. At the same time, it is impossible to achieve the end goal of human emancipation without questioning the existing oppressive power structures and institutions; hence, this paper will also take a poststructuralist outlook to the question of security and deconstruct the concept of the national security state, in addition to the flawed neo-realist notion of security. The [National] Security Dilemma Under the lens of critical theory, there are many problems with the current framework of national security. First, security is a paradox for the more we add to the national security agenda, the more we have to fear. As Barry Buzan (1991, 37) points out in People, States and Fear, the security paradox presents us with a cruel irony in that to be secure ultimately, would mean “being unable to escape.” Thus, to secure oneself, one would need to be trapped in a timeless state, for leaving this state would incur risks. The current neo-realist realization of national security is quite narrow and does not take into account threats to human welfare, health, social problems, and domestic sources of insecurity. However, in Security: A New Framework of Analysis, several CSS theorists put forward the case for widening the field of security studies and separating these into five different sectors under state control: military, politics, environment, society and economy (Buzan, De Wilde and Waever 1998, 21-23). But, since these wideners leave the referent object of security as the state, widening the field of security studies becomes even more troubling because it risks more state control over our lives, the militarization of social issues such as drugs and crime, which would further legitimize and justify state violence, leaving us all the more insecure. Accordingly, it becomes clear that a mere re- definition of “security” away from its current neo-realist framework does not solve the security dilemma if the referent object of security is left unchanged. This goes to prove that it is the state as the referent object that requires questioning in terms of its supposed provision of security rather than the problems with widening the field of security. Without a state-centric concept of security, there would be no national security agenda left to widen, as our security concerns would be human-centered, hence, the paradox of security would dissipate. A second part of the security paradox is that security and insecurity are not binary opposites. On a micro-level, if security is the state of being secure, than insecurity should be the state of not being secure. However, what we do feel secure about is neither part of the national security agenda nor a conscious thought or feeling. The state of being secure is thus, not conceptualized as an absence of insecurity. On a policymaking level, Robert Lipschutz (1995, 27), Associate Professor of Politics at University of California, Santa Cruz, notes in On Security that our desire to achieve security through the acquisition of arms and a national missile “defense” system, serves to insecure those whom we label and treat as threats. This encourages the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and offensive posturing by those we wish to secure ourselves against, causing us to feel more insecure as the end result of our search for security. More recently, when George W. Bush included North Korea in his illogical “Axis of Evil” and named it as a threat to the United States, the peripheral state had no nuclear capability and would never have thought to use the threat of weapons of mass destruction to blackmail Western powers into giving aid. However, alarmed at the thought of being the next Afghanistan or Iraq, North Korea retaliated within a year by revealing its nuclear arsenal. The United States watched helplessly as one more previously benign nation became a real security problem. As a consequence, imagined enemies become real threats due to the ongoing threat construction by the state, and this poses the security dilemma of creating self-fulfilling prophecies in the current framework of security. Our notion of security is what the state says it is, rather than what we feel it is. Yet, this entrenched view of security is epistemologically flawed, which is our second dilemma; meaning that our knowledge of security as it is defined is based in certain realist assumptions that do not hold up under scrutiny. Our perception of what and from whom we need to be secured is not based on the actual threats that exist, but on the threats that we are told to perceive by the state. Thus, terrorists, drugs, illegal immigrants, “Third World” dictators, rogue states, blacks, non-Christians, and the Other, are considered as threats to the national security apparatus, and consequently, as threats to the individual American. This state construction of threats pervades our minds, causing a trickle-down effect that encourages a culture of fear, where the only limit to the coming danger is our imagination. Lipschutz (2000, 44-45) concludes in After Authority: War, Peace, and Global Politics in the 21st Century, “the national security state is brought down to the level of the household, and each one arms itself against the security dilemma posed by its neighbor across the hedge of fence.” Lipschutz seems to be saying that it is national security that eventually encourages the creation of a dichotomy between the self and the Other in our everyday lives. Indeed, it is the discourse of security by the rulers and elites, which creates and sustains our bipolar mindset of the world. A final dilemma presented by the current security framework is that security is ontologically unstable, unable to exist on its own, requiring the creation of certain conditions and categories, specifically, the creation of the Other. James Der Derian (1995, 25), Associate Professor of Political Science at U Mass (Amherst), notes in On Security that we are taught to consider security as “an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread belief in it.” Yet, national security is a highly unstable concept and changes over time, with the construction of new threats and enemies. Due to its unstable nature, security can then, be considered as a constant fluid that is constructed and re- defined by the discourse of the state and security elites. Ole Waever, a senior researcher at the Center for Peace and Conflict Research, contends that the very act of uttering “security” places it on the security agenda, thereby giving the state and its elite, power over the issue. In On Security, he notes that “in naming a certain development a security problem, the state can claim a special right, one that in the final instance, always be defined by the state and its elites” (1995, 55). This process is termed as “securitization,” which simply means treating an event or issue as a problem of national security rather than first questioning whether it should even be treated as a security issue. Such an act serves the interests of the state and its elites, starting with security discourse by the state, which constructs and perpetuates state identity and existence. Purpose(s) of Securitization: (1) Identity Construction and the Preservation of the State Identity is not a stable and stationary concept; it is constantly redefined and reconstructed to meet new challenges and adapt to new events. It would be easier to draw a parallel between gender identity and state identity to exemplify this concept. Contrary to mainstream thought, gender identity is socially constructed and keeps changing throughout our lives. Comparably, the identity of the state is also in a constant state of flux. The state and its elites are involved in identity work when they place or take things off the national security agenda. And similarly to gender identity, which requires the presence of difference (masculine and feminine) in order for gender to have any meaning, the state requires the existence of the Other to build an identity for the self. This identity is a performative constitution, taking the shape of security discourse, and thus, the “constitution of identity is achieved through the inscription of boundaries that serve to demarcate an ‘inside’ from and ‘outside,’ a ‘self’ from an ‘other,’ a ‘domestic’ from a ‘foreign’ (Campbell 1998, 9). The state moves to eliminate the Other and claim sovereignty over the outside and the foreign. In doing so, the state gains power and control over foreign policy, and international relations becomes a field concerned with building boundaries instead of bridges. However, since the identity of the state is fluid, boundaries do change over time though the performative constitution of state identity, which occurs through security discourse. This positional identity construction will be examined in terms of the Cold War and Post-Cold War era, but it is important to note that the discourse of fear and danger, in order to construct state identity, is not new to the modern nation-state. David Campbell (1998, 49), Professor of International Politics at University of Newcastle in England, suggests in Writing Security that the discourse of danger by the state is as old as Christendom for “thinking that Western civilization was besieged by a horde of enemies (Turks, Jews, heretics, witches), the church saw the devil everywhere and encouraged guilt to such an extent that a culture of anxiety ensured.” Today, Turks, Jews, heretics and witches have simply been replaced with rogue nations, “Arab terrorists,” communists, and “Third World” dictators through security discourse. After the fall of Christendom, danger has become the new God of Western civilization, and according to Campbell (1998, 48), the discourse of threat construction provides a “new theology of truth...about who and what we are by highlighting who or what ‘we’ are not, and what ‘we’ have to fear.” This demonstrates the inherent unstable nature of security as defined by the national security state, and the never-ending construction of identity through the otherization of difference. Instead of celebrating our different identities and bridging the gaps present in international relations, the national security state has drawn boundaries by constructing an identity in opposition to the Other. The Cold War serves as the classic example of statist identity construction through the creation of the Other, which created more insecurity than security for the entire world. After the fall of Hitler and the Axis powers, the United States emerged as a superpower, along with the Soviet Union, which had been a key ally in the war. Due to the neo-realist obsession with an ordered world operating under the assumption that states exist in an anarchic system, the United States formulated an identity of the self that was opposed to disorder and incivility. Out of the Cold War discourse of the Other came the national security state, which was defined by the National Security Act of 1947 (Der Derian 1992, 76), a measure that Truman regretted signing by the time he left office. This national security state found an enemy in the Soviet Union, and created the Other in order to stabilize the self and guarantee its existence. In NSC-68, the United States admitted that even without the threat of Soviet communism, it would still pursue policies designed to shape the world in a more orderly manner (Campbell 1998, 30-31), probably referring to a more capitalist economic order. The Cold War that ensued between the two superpowers became coded as a struggle between good and evil, civilized and barbaric, freedom-loving and totalitarian. Suddenly, the threat of communism was equated to the ruthless and fascist Nazi regime, and communism was “un-American,” as demonstrated by the oppressive activities of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). The search for national security created insecurity for a large number of Americans who were labeled as communists and Soviet-sympathizers, blacklisted and lost their jobs. The identity construction by the American statecraft in opposition to Soviet communism did serve the interests of the elite. Issues such as employment, childcare, women’s rights, universal healthcare, and equal wages were characterized as evil and foreign by being associated with communism and the Soviet Union (Campbell 1998, 140). These domestic issues caused vast human insecurity in the United States, and the Cold War search for security caused insecurity throughout the entire world. It is important to note that the Soviet Union was never a military threat to the United States. This is not to say that the USSR lacked military capability, but that its ability to cause severe damage to the United States was not recognized (and encouraged) until it was construed as the Other. To secure the self from the threat of the Other, the two superpowers engaged in a massive arms buildup, which almost resulted in nuclear annihilation during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Furthermore, they fought proxy wars in underdeveloped countries, destroying millions of lives and infrastructure. The end result of this face-off was a vast amount of human insecurity, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and our existing bipolar mindset of the world. Even today, what constitutes of American is unclear; however, what unites Americans is the threat of what is defined as “un-American” by the national security apparatus. In the Post-September 11 era, identity construction by the American state in terms of us vs. them discourse continues to pervade our consciousness. The threat of a nuclear winter never did materialize, but it seems to have deep frozen the minds of our policymakers, and no amount of thawing makes any difference. George W. Bush is so infected with the “Cold War of the mind” that he keeps coughing up redundant phrases like “they hate freedom,” and “either you are with us or you are with the terrorists," which usually happens every time he stumbles and cannot find anything else in his frozen brain. In a press release after the ‘terrorist’ attack in Bali, Bush stated that “those of us who love freedom must work together to do everything we can to disrupt, deny and bring to justice these people who have no soul, no conscience, people that hate freedom” (U.S. Department of State 2002, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs). Who in their right mind hates freedom?! Then, in his State of the Union address this year, Bush maintained that “the United States has no right, no desire, and no intention to impose our form of government on anyone else. That is one of the main differences between us and our enemies” (U.S. Department of State 2005, Democracy). In all of these cases, the enemy is ill-defined and unknown, simply functioning as an opposition against whom the American state can construct an identity. Additionally, the enemy or the Other is outside the border, and not within, as is represented by “we have to face terrorists abroad so we do not have to fight them here at home.” It is preposterous to think that Americans cannot be terrorists or engage in terrorism, and yet the state ensures us that “we” are peace- loving, free and civil while “they” are constructed as uncivilized, soulless, inhumane, barbaric and oppressive. While functioning as identity construction for the state, this discourse of security also legitimizes state violence in favor of elitist interests. (2) National Security is an Elite Tool National security serves as a function of elite security rather than human security. We have already discussed Waever’s theory on how elites securitize an event or issue through speech acts, and as a result, gain power and resources over an issue. This (national security) speech act also works to create insecurity for the human population. The apartheid regime in South Africa is a classic example of how national security is structured around elite security, while making the majority of the South African population and neighboring nations feel insecure. During the Cold War, national security for the apartheid regime was tied to a portrayal of South Africa as a threatened and unstable state, requiring the constant support of Western powers (Booth and Vale 1997, 335), including the acquisition of nuclear arms from the United States. The black liberation movement in South Africa was characterized as Communist, although the only “ideology” that the movement adhered to was human rights and freedom. The minority white elites simply used the fear of communism to build up a military state and wage war against the majority African population, who were excluded from power. The neighboring states saw South Africa as an all too powerful state with offensive posturing, and thus the security of the apartheid regime translated into insecurity for the surrounding states and the majority of the South African population. In the United States, the securitization of energy policy and the subsequent occupation of Middle East countries has served elite interests while making us all the more insecure. The invasion and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan demonstrates how the national security state works for the economic gain and security of power elites. There was no humane reason to go to war with Afghanistan, but post 9-11, the national security state build up the case for invading and colonizing the country. Not even a single terrorist involved in the September 11 attacks was from Afghanistan. In fact, the United States had helped to prop up the Taliban regime and Osama bin Laden by training and giving them arms in the 1970s to fight against the USSR. In doing so, the United States placed an authoritarian government in power, which was bad news for most Afghans, and especially women. In the weeks leading up to the war, we heard a lot of PR from the White House on the inhumane treatment of women in Afghanistan, including how women were “banned from working, flogged for wearing makeup, even executed for invented sins” (Flanders 2001, 36). Here is another case in point of positional identity construction by the national security state: we uphold women’s rights everywhere and they oppress their own women; it is what they do. The images of helpless and needy women in burkhas and hijabs required that the chauvinistic and patriarchal, (in addition to ethnocentric), security state liberate them from the oppressive conditions. Almost overnight, the anti-abortion and anti-sexual rights George Bush becomes a feminist and makes the case for war by touting the oppression of women by the Taliban. In this case, the outright lie helps in winning overwhelming support for a war that is really being waged for ulterior elitist motives. The war against Afghanistan had everything to do with Big Oil and America’s geopolitical interest in dominating the oil-rich regions of Central Asia and the Middle- East, having very little to do with any security threat posed by the Taliban or Saddam Hussein. Thus, along with Afghanistan, President Bush had a massive number of troops deployed in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Georgia within a few weeks of 9-11, all of which have rich oil reserves worth up to an estimated $4 trillion (Klevemen 2004, 11). This made oil companies such as Unocal happy as they had been fruitlessly trying for years to reach an agreement with the Taliban on building an oil pipeline through Afghanistan. Then, within the first few months of overthrowing the Taliban, President Karzai of Afghanistan, a former Unocal advisor, agreed to the long-planned building of a $3.2 billion oil pipeline running from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan, all the way into the Indian Ocean (Klevemen 2004, 11). Therefore, while Americans are still paying almost $3 at the pump and the number of American soldiers dead is increasing steadily, Big Oil is getting ready to make billions at the expense of human security. The “war against terror” has created massive insecurity for people in the Middle- East and all parts of the world. Al Qaeda networks have proliferated to dozens more countries. While people and soldiers in the thousands are losing their lives in this supposed “war on terror,” millions in the United States are terrorized by the expansion of the national security state. The Bill of Rights has become a victim of state terrorism, as the American statecraft locks up people for an indefinite period without due process of law. The state has been given the green light to perform strip-searches at our ports of entry, and here, race has become a proxy for criminality. Suppression of information and academic freedom, in addition to unauthorized wiretaps has become the law of the land. One would think that the insecurity caused to the American people and to the state apparatus through the blowbacks of hegemony, characterized by 9-11, would de- legitimize the state. Paradoxically, it is the creation of insecurity that stabilizes the state and guarantees its existence. Here, we find the greatest paradox of the state as the provider of security. The tate has always been considered as the primary provider of security and this has been the basis of its existence. However, if the state succeeds in achieving security, it would cease to exist. Hence, Campbell (1998; 13) concludes that “the constant articulation of danger through foreign policy is thus not a threat to a state’s identity or existence: it is its condition of possibility.” Instead of hurting the state or its legitimacy as we might think by default, actual threats and the discourse of danger from the outside help to propel the state and safeguard its existence. Thus, paradoxically, insecurity secures the state! September 11 serves as the perfect example of a state that was struck with a terrible atrocity from outside, and yet, instead of disintegrating, the state gained more power and control over our lives. Indeed, the leader of the most powerful nation of the world would never have won re-election (or rather, be elected for the first time) without the help of this catastrophic event. However, while the state is being secured, it is human security that is sacrificed. In the final analysis then, since national security is diametrically opposed to human security, the state must be dislodged as the primary referent object of security. Deconstructing the [National Security] State Throughout this paper, we have seen cases of how national security is an antonym for human security. With this essential realization, Booth (2005, 33) gives three reasons for why the state should not be the referent object of security: “states are unreliable as primary referents because while some are in the business of security some are not; even those which are producers of security represent the mans and not the ends; and states are too diverse in their character to serve as the basis for a comprehensive theory of security.” Additionally, the cases of South Africa and Afghanistan prove how the national ecurity state is merely an elite tool, which causes human insecurity at home and abroad. The state treats security as a problem that comes from the outside, rather than as a problem that can arise from domestic issues. The end result of state-centric security is that humans are alienated from discussions about their own security and welfare. The most compelling reason is provided by Hayward Akler (2005, 191) in Critical Security Studies and World Politics, in which he states that “economic collapse, political oppression, scarcity, overpopulation, ethnic rivalry, the destruction of nature, terrorism, crime and disease provide more serious threats to the well-being of individuals and the interest of nations.” Thus, to millions of people, it is not the existence of the Other across the border that poses a security problem, but their own state that is a threat to security. The question that arises next is how to put critical theory into practice and deconstruct the national security state. Critical theory does not offer simple one-shot solutions to the problems created by the neo-realist state and elitist conception of security. To give simple answers would be a performative contradiction, especially after criticizing realism for being intellectually rigid for believing in objective truth. In other words, there are no alternatives; just alternative modes of understanding. However, using the poststructuralist Foucaultian analysis that discourse is power, we can move towards deconstructing the power of the state and elites to securitize using their own tool: discourse. The elites who control the meaning of security and define it in terms that are appropriate to their interests hold tremendous power in the national security state. As Foucault astutely observed, “the exercise of power is always deeply entwined with the production of knowledge and discourse” (Dalby 1998, 4). For too long, language has been used against us to create our reality, thereby obfuscating our lens of the world, depriving us from an objective search for truth and knowledge. The history of colonized people shows how the construction of language defined and justified their oppressed status. In a way, we are colonized through discursive practices and subjected to the reality that the state wants us to see. However, definitions belong to the definer, and it is high time that we questioned and defined our own reality. Thus, citizen action is critical to questioning and deconstructing the national security state and taking away its power to define our security. In On Security, Pearl Alice Marsh (1995, 126) advances the idea of a grassroots statecraft that is defined as “challenging foreign policy of government through contending discursive and speech acts.” This calls for pitting the values of civil society against the state establishment and challenging the American statecraft’s freedom to cast issues and events in a security or militarized framework. The United States has not always been a national security state and neither does it have to maintain that hegemonic and oppressive status in order to exist. It is critical to remember that fundamental changes in our institutions and structures of power do not occur from the top; they originate from the bottom. History is case in point. Citizen action was critical to ending the Red Scare and the Vietnam War, as the American people realized the ludicrousness of framing Vietnam as a security issue, which led to the fall of the Second New Deal, the deaths of thousands of American soldiers and a financial cost that we are still shouldering. In the end, what they need to be secured from and how, is a question best left up to individual Americans and subsequently, civil society. Thus, grassroots citizen action performatively makes individuals the referent subject of security as people would call for the demilitarization and desecuritization of issues that are contrary and irrelevant to human security. There is hope for the future and practical application of critical theory in international relations. As Robert Lipschutz (2000, 61) concludes in After Authority: War, Peace, and Global Politics in the 21st Century, “it was the existence of the Other across the border that gave national security its power and authority; it is the disappearance of the border that has vanquished that power.” Britain, France and Germany set aside their historical enmities and became part of a European community, which has formed a new collective identity and security across borders. Cold War rivals that almost annihilated the world are now friends in the “war against terror.” The apartheid regime in South Africa did collapse eventually. In the past two years, India and Pakistan have been moving towards a more peaceful future that also includes fighting the “war against terror” together. While nation-states that were previously hostile to each other have united to be hostile towards other states, it is not overly idealist to suggest that with each new friendship and alliance, there is one less foe and one less Other. The world is not stable and stagnant, existing in an anarchic, nasty and brutish framework in which states have to endlessly bargain for their self-interest, as realists would like us to believe. On the contrary, international relations and the boundaries constructed by the state are subject to change and ever-transitioning, which presents a compelling case for critical theory as a more realistic framework through which we can view international relations. Therefore, our ultimate search for security does not lie in securing the state from the threat of the enemy across the border, but in removing the state as the referent object of security and moving towards human emancipation.

## 2NC – Terrorism – Ahmed

### The 1AC constructs terrorism through a paranoid fantasy of Islomophobia – those who do not fit into the perfect vision of American hegemony become irrational terrorists who must be exterminated – the cycle of genocide becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy where only interrogation of the violent epistemology can break out of the cycle – your ballot should be used as an ethical judgment against the racism that underpins the aff – heads up this card is long

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A range of studies indicate that these diverse phenomena affecting Muslim communities are in fact facets of a single overall social process, conveyed through the concept of Islamophobia.18 While sociological debate on the conceptual utility and coherence of Islamophobia continues, the increasing prevalence of prejudice and discrimination toward Muslim diasporas in the West over the last two decades is testament to the reality of the phenomena it is supposed to capture – whether or not the term is truly accurate as a sociological concept. The idea of Islamophobia conveys the sense of a distinctive form of racism and bigotry targeted specifically at members of Muslim communities, reinforced by negative stereotypes about Islam. In 1997, the Runnymede Trust offered its seminal definition of Islamophobia as a set of attitudes: Islam is perceived as a static, unchanging monolithic block; it is separate and “other”; it lacks values in common with other culture; is inferior to the West; and is irrational, primitive, sexist, violent, aggressive, and supportive of terrorism. Hostility towards Islam is used to justify discriminatory practices against Muslims and the exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society, such that anti- Muslim hostility becomes normalised.19 In 2004, the Council of Europe defined Islamophobia as “the fear of or prejudiced viewpoint towards Islam, Muslims and matters pertaining to them. Whether it takes the shape of daily forms of racism and discrimination or more violent forms, Islamophobia is a violation of human rights and a threat to social cohesion.”20 However, as Maussen points out, there are important theoretical reservations for the use of the catch- all term Islamophobia to encompass so many diverse phenomena. Primarily, the term “groups 3 together all kinds of different forms of discourse, speech and acts, by suggesting that they all emanate from an identical ideological core, which is a „fear‟ or a „phobia‟ of Islam.” This amounts to a form of ideological reductionism which, however, fails to offer any further or deeper explanation of why this irrational fear of Islam has come about, and how it refracts through myriad different social structures into such a wide array of different exclusionary behaviours and processes. Thus, Maussen notes that while “these different kinds of discourse and speech” – such as negative media portrayals of Muslims, legislation impacting primarily or inordinately on Muslims, and sporadic acts of public violence against Muslims – may well be “related and feed into one another, but we cannot simply equate them all and treat them as comparable illustrations of a core ideology named „Islamophobia.‟” There is therefore a need to “distinguish speech and discourse on the one hand, from acts on the other hand.” While discourse and speech may be demeaning, it should not be conflated with “policies which limit the religious freedoms of Muslims, or with acts of violence, such as burning mosques or attacking Muslim girls who wear the headscarf.”21 This sort of critical evaluation of the application of the term Islamophobia raises important issues highlighting the underdevelopment of the concept as a sociological category capable of providing a credible theoretical explanatory framework by which to understand the diverse phenomena of anti- Muslim hostility and discrimination. Clearly, while there may be compelling reason to conclude that many of these phenomena are indeed motivated by a general irrational fear of Islam and Muslims – the causal origins of this irrational mindset are largely ignored in the literature that endorses the concept of Islamophobia. Furthermore, if such an ideological mindset is presumed to be the fundamental problem, how this mindset manages to encompass such a diversity of processes, institutions and behaviours not only in a single society, but indeed across multiple societies simultaneously, remains unexplained. In effect, Islamophobia becomes a self-reinforcing circular concept, in which anti-Muslim hostility is generated by nothing more than an irrational hostility toward Muslims – effectively, Islamophobia creates Islamophobia. Although the conceptual definitions and theoretical efficacy of Islamophobia is therefore still hotly contested in academic literature, it is indisputable that there has been a meteoric rise in anti-Muslim hostility and discrimination on a global scale. According to the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, which has monitored this phenomenon since 2001, Islamophobia in the form of discrimination and violence specifically toward members of Muslim diaspora communities in the EU has increased dramatically. In particular, anti-Muslim prejudice in EU countries is manifest not simply in regressive ideological perspectives leading to acts of violence, but also in tangible exclusionary patterns in housing, education, and employment.22 A report co-sponsored by the University of California, Berkeley, Center for Race and Gender, similarly found evidence that Islamophobia in the US is an increasingly powerful force in the political landscape, negatively affecting Muslims in terms of employment, education, and housing, as well as hate crimes and profiling by security agencies.23 The overall picture is of an increasing sense of unease, fear and hostility between Muslims and non- Muslims over the last decade. Overwhelmingly, this has coincided with a mainstream media narrative in which Islam and Muslims are increasingly projected as “a threat to traditional British customs, values and ways of life”, because “there is no common ground between the West and Islam.”24 Another study by Cardiff University‟s School of Journalism, analyzing UK press coverage of British Muslims from 2000 to 2008, found that “the bulk of coverage of British Muslims – around two thirds – focuses on Muslims as a threat (in relation to terrorism), a problem (in terms of differences in values) or both (Muslim extremism in general).” Further, it concluded that: “Four of the five most common discourses used about Muslims in the British press associate Islam/Muslims with threats, 4 problems or in opposition to dominant British values.”25 A similar study of Islamophobia in the American media concluded that “media stereotyping” after 9/11 “primed Americans to understand the 9/11 attacks as representative of Arab political culture and Islamic devotion,” and was “an important factor in the backlash that afflicted these communities post-9/11.” The study further documents an “alarming deterioration in Islamophobic hate speech in the media” up to 2006.26 A 2008 World Economic Forum study of the way „Muslim-West‟ relations are covered across global media in a total of 24 Muslim-majority and non-Muslim-majority countries found that “negative coverage was 10 times more frequent than positive coverage” with Muslims being “associated with fundamentalist and extremist activities more than six times as often as other religious protagonists.”27 The corporate media‟s increasing demonization of Islam and Muslims is not occurring in a silo, but is being driven very much by the agendas of government and security agencies. On the one hand, the corporate media relies relatively uncritically on government and security agencies for its information on foreign policy and intelligence matters, including terrorism.28 On the other, there have been direct efforts from security agencies to influence the media. Since 1990, for instance, the Pentagon has bribed, pressured, and censored Hollywood film-makers to adapt story lines to support its propaganda.29 Reviewing over a thousand Hollywood movies, Jack Shaheen, Professor Emeritus of Mass Communication at Southern-Illinois University, found that: “Today‟s image makers regularly link the Islamic faith with male supremacy, holy war, and acts of terror, depicting Arab Muslims as hostile alien intruders, and as lecherous, oily sheikhs, intent on using nuclear weapons. When mosques are displayed onscreen, the camera inevitably cuts to Arabs praying, and then gunning down civilians.”30 Here, the mainstream media plays a critical function in ideologically linking the international to the domestic, in particular, the trajectory of Western foreign policy in Muslim-majority theatres across the Middle East and Central Asia, as well as the processes of Islamophobia and radicalisation experienced within Muslim diaspora communities in the West. On the one hand, Islamophobic media narratives buttress anti-Muslim public opinion at home, alienating Muslims and fuelling the extremist rhetoric of far right groups. Simultaneously, images of devastation and destruction from Muslim-majority theatres of war such as Iraq and Afghanistan also distress and anger Muslim diaspora communities, further exacerbating alienation. In effect, the media acts as a symbiotic link between Islamophobia at home and abroad, as it mediates extremist rhetoric from neoconservative and right-wing factions and the official language of government and security agencies who attempt to pander to Islamophobic public opinion on political issues such as immigration and terrorism. Thus, there is perhaps no clearer instantiation of the security-dynamics of Islamophobia than the actual activities of Western security agencies. After the US Department of Justice passed a regulation allowing indefinite detention on 20th September 2001, nearly 1,200 Arabs and Muslims were secretly arrested and detained without charge.31 The US National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) “call-in” program required male visitors from twenty-four Arab and Muslim countries and North Korea to register with INS offices. No terrorists were found, yet over 13,000 of the 80,000 men who registered were threatened with deportation, and many were “detained in harsh conditions.”32 In the UK, more than a thousand Muslims have been detained without charge under anti-terror laws, out of which only a handful have been convicted of terrorist offences. Worldwide, more than 100,000 Muslim men – victims of the CIA‟s extraordinary rendition programme – are being detained without charges “in secretive American-run jails and interrogation centres similar to the notorious Abu Ghraib Prison” under conditions which violate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions on the Treatment of Prisoners, and UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.33 5 Such practices accompany Anglo-American military engagements in predominantly Muslim theatres of war, regions often described as dangerous failed zones harbouring potential Islamist terrorists planning to inflict apocalyptic forms of mass destruction on Western civilization.34 Such military engagements also tend to result in the indiscriminate killings of predominantly Muslim civilians, and correlate invariably with their strategic location vis-à-vis contested energy reserves in the Middle East, Central Asia and Northwest Africa. Iraq provides a case-in-point. From 1991 to 2007, the total civilian death toll in Iraq as a direct and indirect consequence of Anglo-American invasions, socio-economic deprivation, infrastructure destruction, and occupation amounts to approximately 3 million over a period of sixteen years.35 The scale of this violence is thus larger than some of the most well-known cases of twentieth century genocide such as in Cambodia, Kampuchea, Yugoslavia, and Rwanda. As Walt points out, estimating the number of Muslims killed directly and indirectly by U.S. forces over the last 30 years suggests at least 100 Muslim fatalities for every US one. He thus observes: “When you kill tens of thousands of people in other countries – and sometimes for no good reason – you shouldn‟t be surprised when people in those countries are enraged by this behavior and interested in revenge.”36 This argument amply refutes the assumption that foreign policy has no relationship to terrorism and violent radicalisation. In particular, taking a broader historical view of the continuity of US-UK interventionism in the Gulf region going back to 1991 demonstrates not only the immense scale of the violence inflicted upon Iraqi civilians, but also illustrates that British interventionism in the region preceded the emergence and proliferation of Islamist-inspired terrorist attacks against Western targets. Thus, Ralph argues that the massive military violence that has been inflicted predominantly on the civilian populations of Muslim-majority regions is only possible by their having been “Islamophobically” constructed as having lives that are of less value compared to those of Western citizens.37 But while the irrational fear of Islam and Muslims is clearly a significant factor in all these disparate phenomena, Islamophobia as a sociological concept offers little by way of a coherent causal explanation of how or why these phenomena are escalating simultaneously. Islamophobia as Securitization It is therefore imperative to recognize that Islamophobia is distinctive precisely as a unique form of securitization targeted specifically at Muslim communities in the context of the particular objectives, interests and anxieties of powerful political actors. Indeed, Islamophobia cannot be understood as a sociological category without situating it in the context of the evolving socio-political relations of global imperialism, which in turn explain the political dynamic of the securitization of Muslim communities. Wæver‟s seminal concept of securitisation referred to a „speech act‟ – an act of labelling – whereby political authorities identify an existential threat to the state which, because of its extreme nature, justifies moving beyond conventional security measures within the public rule of law, thus permitting the execution of extra-legal emergence powers that are henceforth “above politics.”38 Thus, Buzan et. al argued that “the priority and the urgency of an existential threat” permits the state resort to consistent “violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed.” Securitisation thus legitimises the state of exception and the suspension of democracy.39 6 In the early 1990s, Willy Claes, then NATO Secretary-General identified “Islamic fundamentalism” as a new threat to Western Europe replacing the defunct USSR.40 By the late 1990s, a number of hearings had been held in the Congress and Senate on the Islamist threat from the Middle East and Central Asia.41 The publication of Samuel Huntington‟s influential thesis on the clash of civilizations was a decisive turning-point in the solidification of this strategic thinking.42 After 9/11, security agencies increasingly generalized the threat of Islamist terrorism as being, despite its marginality, nevertheless widely dispersed throughout Muslim communities, necessitating comprehensive regimes of surveillance, policing and in some regions counterinsurgency. A sensitive briefing paper published by the Pentagon agency, Counterintelligence Field Activity (which operated from 2002 to 2008, after which its activities were subsumed by the Defense Intelligence Agency), argued that “political Islam wages an ideological battle against the non-Islamic world at the tactical, operational and strategic level. The West‟s response is focused at the tactical and operation level, leaving the strategic level – Islam – unaddressed.” The paper concludes that “Islam is an ideological engine of war (Jihad),” and “no one is looking for its off switch” due to political “indecision [over] whether Islam is radical or being radicalized.” Attempting to review the Qur‟an and Prophetic traditions, the paper infers that “Strategic themes suggest Islam is radical by nature... Muhammad‟s behaviors today would be defined as radical.” Western policymakers can no longer afford to overlook the “cult characteristics of Islam.” Indeed even Islam‟s advocacy of charity – the principle known as Zakat considered an obligatory „pillar‟ of Islam – is described as “an asymmetrical war-fighting funding mechanism.” The only reason that the US has failed to suffer scattered insurgent terrorist attacks – as opposed to the single, concentrated and catastrophic attack of 9/11 – is primarily due to its relatively small Muslim population. Accordingly, the threat of such insurgency will increase as the Muslim minority grows and gains more influence. The Pentagon cites successful and attempted terrorist attacks in Britain, along with the predominantly Muslim riots in France, as examples.43 Thus, Tim Savage, division chief at the State Department‟s Office of European Analysis argues that Europe‟s Muslim population is expected to double while its non-Muslim population is projected to fall by at least 3.5 per cent. At worse, he speculates that by mid-century Muslims might outnumber non-Muslims not only in France, but throughout Western Europe. European intelligence analysts already estimate that up to 2 per cent of the continent‟s Muslims – half a million people – are involved in extremist activity. This number, for which no corroborating evidence exists, is so huge according to Savage not because of the role of Islamic fundamentalism per se, but rather simply due to the inevitable “chemistry resulting from Muslims‟ encounter with Europe [which] seems to make certain individuals more susceptible to recruitment into terrorist activities.” Therefore, he implies, terrorists are supposedly born simply from the identity crisis generated by Muslim immigration to Europe – “A larger group of terrorists by far is recruited from the masses of young men, many of them middle- class, who experience a sort of culture shock in Europe and become radicalized „born again‟ Islamists.”44 Security agencies are preoccupied with population politics not only in the context of the alleged dangers posed by the rising number of Muslims in the US, Britain and Western Europe, but also in terms of rising populations in the South in general, and intensifying population movements toward the West as people attempt to escape the calamities created by climate change, food insecurity and resource scarcity. In this sense, security agencies project a direct connection between the question of civil unrest, global crises and rising populations of „Others‟, particularly Muslims. According to then-CIA Director Michael V. Hayden, rising world population and immigration “could undermine the stability of some of the world‟s most fragile states, especially in Africa, while in the 7 West, governments will be forced to grapple with ever larger immigrant communities and deepening divisions over ethnicity and race.” Noting the projected 33 percent growth in global population over the next 40 years, he warned that regional friendly oil-exporting regimes “like Niger and Libya will be forced to rapidly find food, shelter and jobs for millions, or deal with restive populations that „could be easily attracted to violence, civil unrest, or extremism.‟” Corroborating the fears described above, he added that rising world population would also have a debilitating impact within the West due to growing ethnicity differentials between shrinking and expanding population groups: “European countries, many of which already have large immigrant communities, will see particular growth in their Muslim populations while the number of non-Muslims will shrink as birthrates fall. „Social integration of immigrants will pose a significant challenge to many host nations – again boosting the potential for unrest and extremism,‟ Hayden said.”45 Furthermore, Muslim communities – both in the form of diasporas in the West and Muslim-majority countries in strategic regions of the Middle East, Central Asia and North Africa – are perceived to cut across the faultlines of increasingly complex non-traditional security challenges such as climate change, energy depletion, water shortages and food insecurity. A recent US Army War College study makes reference to Huntington‟s clash thesis, arguing that while it “captured the possibilities” already emerging in the 1990s: “... the future and its implications are even darker than what Professor Huntington suggested.... The confluence between the world‟s greatest reserves of petroleum and the extraordinary difficulties that the Islamic world is having, and will continue to have, in confronting a civilization that has taken the West 900 years to develop will create challenges that strategists are only now beginning to grasp.”46 In other words, there is a direct link between Western energy interests, the „War on Terror‟, and the West‟s military pre-occupation with the Muslim world. For example, the US Joint Forces Command draws attention to the danger of global energy depletion through to 2030. Warning of „the dangerous vulnerabilities the growing energy crisis presents‟, the report concludes that „The implications for future conflict are ominous.‟47 Once again, the subject turns to demographics: „In total, the world will add approximately 60 million people each year and reach a total of 8 billion by the 2030s‟, 95 per cent accruing to developing countries, while populations in developed countries slow or decline. „Regions such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, where the youth bulge will reach over 50% of the population, will possess fewer inhibitions about engaging in conflict.‟48 The assumption is that regions which happen to be both energy-rich and Muslim-majority will also be sites of violent conflict due to their rapidly growing populations. A British Ministry of Defence report concurs with this assessment, highlighting an inevitable „youth bulge‟ by 2035, with some 87 per cent of all people under the age of 25 inhabiting developing countries. In particular, the Middle East population will increase by 132 per cent, and sub-Saharan Africa by 81 per cent. Growing resentment due to „endemic unemployment‟ will be channelled through „political militancy, including radical political Islam whose concept of Umma, the global Islamic community, and resistance to capitalism may lie uneasily in an international system based on nation-states and global market forces.‟49 8 The Exclusionary Logic of Securitization Thus, the securitisation of global crisis leads not only to the problematisation of particular religious and ethnic groups in foreign regions of geopolitical interest, but potentially extends this problematisation to any social group which might challenge prevailing global political economic structures across racial, national and class lines. The previous examples illustrates how securitisation paradoxically generates insecurity by reifying a process of militarisation against social groups that are constructed as external to the prevailing geopolitical and economic order – that is, who are anathema to imperial interests. Due to the geopolitical significance of Muslim-majority regions to imperial interests and their links to Muslim diasporas in the West, this securitization process overwhelmingly focuses on the externalisation of Muslims. Hence, a simple discursive analysis of Islamophobia is insufficient to understand its causal dynamics. For the mere identification of a security issue does not necessarily corresponding to an objective threat, but represents the interests of power. This also means that the state of exception cannot simply be unilaterally decreed by the sovereign, but that the act of speech must conform to a normative grammar of security by a position of authority speaking to an audience that understands and is convinced by this act. Thus, the specific socio-political relations that lead to securitisation are under- theorised. As McDonald points out: “The potential for security to be constructed over time through a range of incremental processes and representations is not addressed, and the question of why particular representations resonate with relevant constituencies is under‐theorized.”50 He notes that questions like “Why are some political communities more likely to view certain actors and dynamics as threatening? What role do narratives of history, culture and identity have in underpinning or legitimating particular forms of securitization?” are obscured.51 Yet answers to such questions must go beyond a form of discourse-reductionism focusing exclusively on „narratives of history, cultural and identity‟, to explore the political economy with which these narratives are co-extensive. As Doug Stokes points out: “While the WoT [„War on Terror‟] is undoubtedly a discursive complex whereby modes of representation about terrorism, non-Western populations and the construction of stark boundaries (you are either with us or with the terrorists) operate to exclude and include, it is also intimately bound up with political and economic processes... Specifically, the wars launched in the name of counter-terrorism are not purely driven by certain hegemonic discourses, but are also part of the West‟s economic interests in oil, strategic interests in military bases in the Middle East and the desire to maintain American hegemony into the twenty-first century by controlling one of the crucial resource-rich regions for global capitalism.”52 In other words, the hegemonic construction of exclusionary discourses is always inherently politically-constituted, and therefore by the same token, politically-embedded and politically- transformative. Rather than securitisation only justifying the suspension of law to pave the way for exceptional measures outside the political, contemporary security constructions of „Islam‟ and „Muslims‟ show that it can also lead to a form of governmentality that permanently transforms the way in which populations are politically managed and reproduced.53 The Paris school of Security Studies thus points out that securitisation is equally about risk management, actively conducted by security professionals working across multiple social bureaucracies in the army, intelligence services, police forces, border controls, defence companies, insurance firms, and so on. Their activities construct “regimes of truth” which draw on “numerical data and statistics, technologies of biometrics and sociological profiles of potential dangerous behaviour” to “determine what exactly constitutes 9 security”, and whose expertise empowers them to advise state-leaders.54 Securitisation therefore “works through everyday technologies, through the effects of power that are continuous rather than exceptional, through political struggles, and especially through institutional competition within the professional security field in which the most trivial interests are at stake.”55 The Paris school thus highlights that the state-level „speech act‟ privileged by the Copenhagen school cannot simply appear ex-nihilo as a discursive rupture that innovates a completely new „regime of truth‟, but must emerge from prior „normal‟ political processes therefore amplifying pre-existing exclusionary „regimes of truth‟ in new directions. Yet while identifying the role of “interests”, “institutional competition” and the status of the “professional security field”, the Paris schools offers no exploration of the concrete political and economic structures by which these are constituted, and how they thus interact with and relate to the operation of state power. By what socio-political relations is the expertise of security professionals privileged and sanctioned by the state? What historically- specific social conditions prompt the construction of exclusionary „regimes of truth‟ through processes of everyday political institutional struggles, as well as through extraordinary acts of state- level decisionism enforcing exceptional measures? Furthermore, the sharp theoretical distinction between the Copenhagen and Paris schools collapses in the face of historical and empirical reality. Anti-Western terrorist attacks such as 9/11 prompt state- level emergency responses which, justified by the perception of unprecedented threat, lead to adoption of extraordinary military and police responses. Yet these responses do not merely suspend constitutional law in the face of emergency – they establish permanence precisely through exploiting the declared state of emergency to legitimise the institutionalisation of exceptional measures within the body politic, thus purporting to permanently transform the constitutional order. Securitisation, in other words, can lead to wholesale militarisation of society. Of course, this is not to suggest that the suspension of elements of the constitutional order leading to its permanent transformation amounts to a wholesale annulment of democracy. Rather, this process of militarisation encompasses the progressive institutionalisation of exceptional extra-constitutional measures – this undermines the democratic system on security grounds, and continually threatens to subvert it further. Yet what remains unanswered here is the very nature of the political processes that drive securitisation, their institutional origin, and the socio-political relations by which they are constituted. Ultimately, the most significant underlying causal factor is a deepening perception of fundamental social crisis. New conceptual developments in genocide studies throw further light on this in terms of the concrete socio-political dynamics of securitisation processes. It is now widely recognised, for instance, that the distinguishing criterion of genocide is not the pre-existence of primordial groups, one of whom destroys the other on the basis of a pre-eminence in bureaucratic military-political power. Rather, genocide is the intentional attempt to destroy a particular social group that has been socially constructed as different.56 In Hinton‟s words: “Genocides are distinguished by a process of „othering‟ in which the boundaries of an imagined community are reshaped in such a manner that a previously „included‟ group (albeit often included only tangentially) is ideologically recast (almost always in dehumanizing rhetoric) as being outside the community, as a threatening and dangerous „other‟ – whether racial, political, ethnic, religious, economic, and so on – that must be annihilated.”57 In other words, genocidal violence is inherently rooted in a prior and ongoing ideological process, whereby exclusionary group categories are innovated, constructed and „Otherised‟ in accordance with a specific socio-political programme. The very process of identifying and classifying particular groups 10 as outside the boundaries of an imagined community of „inclusion‟, justifying exculpatory violence toward them, is itself a political act without which genocide would be impossible.58 This recalls Lemkin‟s recognition that the intention to destroy a group is integrally conjoined to a wider socio- political project – or colonial project – designed to perpetuate the political, economic, cultural and ideological relations of the perpetrators in the place of that of the victims, by interrupting or eradicating their means of social reproduction. Only by interrogating the dynamic and origins of this programme to uncover the social relations from which that programme derives, can the emergence of genocidal intent become explicable.59 Building on this insight, Semelin demonstrates that the process of exclusionary social group construction invariably derives from political processes emerging from deep-seated socio-political crises that undermine the prevailing framework of civil order and social norms; and which can, for one social group, be seemingly resolved by projecting anxieties onto a new „outsider‟ group deemed to be somehow responsible for crisis conditions. It is in this context that various forms of mass violence, which may or may not eventually culminate in actual genocide, can become legitimised as contributing to the resolution of crises.60 This does not imply that the current logic of securitisation is necessarily genocidal. Rather, the same essential dynamics of social polarisation and exclusionary group identity formation evident in genocides are highly relevant in understanding the radicalisation processes behind contemporary mass violence. This highlights the fundamental connection between social crisis, the break-down of prevailing norms, the formation of new exclusionary group identities, and the projection of blame for crisis onto a newly constructed „outsider‟ group vindicating various forms of violence. Conclusions Widespread government and public anxieties about the overlapping dangers of global recession, environmental degradation, resource depletion, food price inflation, violent conflict, terrorism, and so on, can often translate into a mistrust of prevailing institutions and norms. Depending on one‟s political orientation, this can lead to the projection of those anxieties onto specific institutions, norms, or even social groups. It is in this context that historians of mass violence point out that the processes that lead to genocide invariably commence with the eruption of social crisis generating radical uncertainty, which is subliminally resolved by projection of blame onto social groups who begin to be constructed as outsiders. Their extermination, partial or otherwise, is thus increasingly viewed as a „final solution‟ by which the perpetrator group exculpates itself and psychologically alleviates its anxieties about entrenched crises.61 In the contemporary global context, the securitization of Islam and Muslims driving the entrenchment of Islamophobia is itself being driven by a deepening perception of social crises at multiple levels of society, vindicating the sense of a fundamental failure of prevailing institutions and values. At the level of defence planning, the pre-9/11 official recognition of an ongoing and inevitable decline in U.S. hegemony has been compounded by the emergence and prevalence of non-traditional security challenges whose dynamic has been accelerated precisely by the normal functioning of the US.- dominate global political economy. The strategic imperative throughout the „War on Terror‟ to shore11 up an increasingly beleaguered U.S. hegemony through domination of the world‟s critical energy resources and transhipment routes has in turn focused the imaginations of security agencies on the problematic role of Muslim-majority regions. Simultaneously, the institutionalization of this paranoia about the security threat potentially posed by Islam and Muslims in the form of wide-ranging new domestic police-powers – combined with the corporate media‟s normalization of mass military violence in Muslim-majority regions as „par for the course‟ required to defend Western civilization against terrorism – has generated a parallel paranoia throughout Western societies. This irrational paranoia grows increasingly targeted and dangerous as global ecological, energy and economic crises – largely systemic in origin – continue to undermine the social fabric, to the impotence of the conventional paraphernalia of the Western political bureaucracy. This further fuels both government and public anxieties, and intensifies the securitization processes that drive the social polarisation of insider and outsider groups, of which Muslims are the focal point. In this context, does the conduct of actual Anglo-American military engagements in Muslim-majority regions, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Algeria, and so on, indicate an Islamophobic „Muslim- centric‟ dynamic to such practices, evincing a tendentially genocidal logic, or is the systematic targeting of largely Muslim groups simply an accident of geopolitical interest? This discussion suggests that the answer is both. Processes of „Otherization‟ due to securitization tend to become increasingly radicalized on the ground precisely in the context of increasingly violent socio-political contestations and social crisis. It is not a far cry to suggest that US wars in Muslim-majority theatres of war are therefore undergoing a process of radicalization, fuelled by both the difficulty and entrenchment of conflict in for instance Afghanistan and Pakistan, the terrorism that conflict inevitably generates, as well as the systemic non-traditional security challenges such as food, water and economic problems increasingly afflicting Muslim-majority regions. This, of course, brings us to the thorny question, given our reference to the genocide literature, of how to conceptualize the intentional dynamic of much of this violence, particularly given that it often involves massive and indiscriminate killings of predominantly Muslim civilians. These killings are not only “degenerate” in Shaw‟s sense of the foreseeable, tacitly-condoned collateral damage of technologized ways of war designed to minimize Western military casualties.62 They often include confirmed episodes of deliberate targeting of civilians as an integral strategy of war. Congressional testimony of US Army combat veterans in Iraq, for example, refers to “free fire orders... described by the Soldiers who had been deployed during the invasion as coming from their commanders who told them „kill everything that moves‟ which included all civilians.”63 Even episodes of violence largely attributed to US incompetence may be more problematic, requiring more detailed empirical determination. Iraq expert Toby Dodge for instance emphasises that a substantive portion of civilian deaths in Iraq are due to the escalation of violent sectarian conflict under the “complete collapse” of the administrative and coercive capacities of the Iraqi state, for which he primarily blames “the United States‟ inability to reconstruct them.”64 Yet his analysis overlooks compelling evidence that at least to some degree, US forces intentionally brought about this collapse and exacerbated sectarian divisions as a strategy to weaken Iraq‟s capacity for self- determination, thereby consolidating its dependence on US security forces and legitimizing a permanent de facto occupation. Several credible journalistic and intelligence investigations argue that elements of the Bush administration envisaged a forcible division of Iraq along ethno-religious lines from the outset of its war-planning, and that for some years the US actively financed an eclectic panoply of Shi‟ite death squads and Sunni insurgents, both prime culprits in sectarian violence.65 Cook, in this vein, suggests that at least in part the sectarian chaos in Iraq and the Middle East is the intended outcome of an imperial strategy of „divide-and-rule.‟66 12 On the other hand, clear differences in US and British approaches further complexify the picture and underscore again the need for a nuanced approach. While US forces in Afghanistan frequently call on air support, which has resulted in indiscriminate bombings of Afghan civilians; British forces have adopted precisely the opposite strategy, preferring to work on the ground and explicitly minimizing reliance on air support precisely to try to minimize Afghan civilian casualties with a view to increase popular support. In other words, even while at some level it seems plausible that Islamophobic processes of „Otherization‟ due to securitization are at work, the dynamic of violence cannot be simplistically reduced to this, and each conflict on the ground generates its own specific trajectories that require careful explanation. It would therefore be premature and unwarranted to causally reduce these disparate phenomena – the military violence of the „War on Terror‟ in foreign theatres in Muslim-majority regions, its domestic corollary in counter-terror police-powers focusing largely on Muslim diasporas, and the escalation of exclusionary paranoia and hostility toward Islam and Muslims from Western mainstream institutions – to an amorphous conception of „Islamophobia‟. While these processes should not simply be theorized as a single continuum of imperial Islamophobic violence tending potentially toward genocidal conduct, it is equally mistaken to ignore the fact that these phenomena are intimately interrelated. This interrelation can only be understood in the context of the imperial socio-political relations of securitization – the deepening perception of social and global crisis, and the projection of anxieties toward these crises onto the geopolitical faultlines of an increasingly fragile U.S.-dominated global political economy, which happen to cross Muslim-majority regions of the Middle East, Central Asia and North Africa. While contemporary Islamophobia, then, encompasses these different domestic and global processes, it is itself in some ways merely an ideological symptom of a global Western civilization that is in many ways coming apart at the seams. Yet increasingly, the symptom is itself feeding back on and radicalizing the dynamic of the systemic processes by which it is generated. The overwhelming danger is that if present trends in the international system are permitted to continue – the normalization of imperial military violence abroad, the legitimization of draconian policing at home, and the unravelling of social relations due to the intensification of socio-political and economic crisis – these trends may well begin to culminate in increasingly genocidal outcomes.

## Perm debate

### Vote neg to refrain from the basic terms of reference – only critique solves

Graeme Cheeseman, Snr. Lecturer @ New South Wales, and Robert Bruce, ‘96 (Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9)KENTUCKY

This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is in itself a considerable part of the problem to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. I IT challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she (THEY ARE) is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference.

### AND – alt has an external net benefit – structural violence – their focus on threats obscures causes of insecurity – only human security solves

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It may have once been the case that being attacked by another country was a major threat to the lives of ordinary people. It may also be true that there are still some pretty serious dangers out there associated with the spread of nuclear weapons. For the most part, however, most of what you’ve been told about national security and all the big threats which can supposedly kill you is one big con designed to distract you from the things that can really hurt you, such as the poverty, inequality and structural violence of capitalism, global warming, and the manufacture and proliferation of weapons – among others.¶ The facts are simple and irrefutable: you’re far more likely to die from lack of health care provision than you are from terrorism; from stress and overwork than Iranian or North Korean nuclear missiles; from lack of road safety than from illegal immigrants; from mental illness and suicide than from computer hackers; from domestic violence than from asylum seekers; from the misuse of legal medicines and alcohol abuse than from international drug lords. And yet, politicians and the servile media spend most of their time talking about the threats posed by terrorism, immigration, asylum seekers, the international drug trade, the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea, computer hackers, animal rights activism, the threat of China, and a host of other issues which are all about as equally unlikely to affect the health and well-being of you and your family. Along with this obsessive and perennial discussion of so-called ‘national security issues’, the state spends truly vast sums on security measures which have virtually no impact on the actual risk of dying from these threats, and then engages in massive displays of ‘security theatre’ designed to show just how seriously the state takes these threats – such as the x-ray machines and security measures in every public building, surveillance cameras everywhere, missile launchers in urban areas, drones in Afghanistan, armed police in airports, and a thousand other things. This display is meant to convince you that these threats are really, really serious.¶ And while all this is going on, the rulers of society are hoping that you won’t notice that increasing social and economic inequality in society leads to increased ill health for a growing underclass; that suicide and crime always rise when unemployment rises; that workplaces remain highly dangerous and kill and maim hundreds of people per year; that there are preventable diseases which plague the poorer sections of society; that domestic violence kills and injures thousands of women and children annually; and that globally, poverty and preventable disease kills tens of millions of people needlessly every year. In other words, they are hoping that you won’t notice how much structural violence there is in the world.¶ More than this, they are hoping that you won’t notice that while literally trillions of dollars are spent on military weapons, foreign wars and security theatre (which also arguably do nothing to make any us any safer, and may even make us marginally less safe), that domestic violence programmes struggle to provide even minimal support for women and children at risk of serious harm from their partners; that underfunded mental health programmes mean long waiting lists to receive basic care for at-risk individuals; that drug and alcohol rehabilitation programmes lack the funding to match the demand for help; that welfare measures aimed at reducing inequality have been inadequate for decades; that health and safety measures at many workplaces remain insufficiently resourced; and that measures to tackle global warming and developing alternative energy remain hopelessly inadequate.¶ Of course, none of this is surprising. Politicians are a part of the system; they don’t want to change it. For them, all the insecurity, death and ill-health caused by capitalist inequality are a price worth paying to keep the basic social structures as they are. A more egalitarian society based on equality, solidarity, and other non-materialist values would not suit their interests, or the special interests of the lobby groups they are indebted to. It is also true that dealing with economic and social inequality, improving public health, changing international structures of inequality, restructuring the military-industrial complex, and making the necessary economic and political changes to deal with global warming will be extremely difficult and will require long-term commitment and determination. For politicians looking towards the next election, it is clearly much easier to paint immigrants as a threat to social order or pontificate about the ongoing danger of terrorists. It is also more exciting for the media than stories about how poor people and people of colour are discriminated against and suffer worse health as a consequence.¶ Viewed from this vantage point, national security is one massive confidence trick – misdirection on an epic scale. Its primary function is to distract you from the structures and inequalities in society which are the real threat to the health and wellbeing of you and your family, and to convince you to be permanently afraid so that you will acquiesce to all the security measures which keep you under state control and keep the military-industrial complex ticking along.¶ Keep this in mind next time you hear a politician talking about the threat of uncontrolled immigration, the risk posed by asylum seekers or the threat of Iran, or the need to expand counter-terrorism powers. The question is: when politicians are talking about national security, what is that they don’t want you to think and talk about? What exactly is the misdirection they are engaged in? The truth is, if you think that terrorists or immigrants or asylum seekers or Iran are a greater threat to your safety than the capitalist system, you have been well and truly conned, my friend. Don’t believe the hype: you’re much more likely to die from any one of several forms of structural violence in society than you are from immigrants or terrorism. Somehow, we need to challenge the politicians on this fact.